NOTES by unknown
Notes
LTABILrrY OF AGENT UPON DISAFFMANCE OF EXECUTED CONTRACT BY INFANT
PRINCIPAL
IT was early recognized that when an agent contracted on behalf of a principal
whom he failed to bind thereby, he might be liable for damages if he fraudulently
misrepresented the existence or extent of his authority,1 or, where the language of the
contract indicated an intent that the agent be personally responsible, be might him-
self be bound as promisor.2 Shortly after the beginning of the nineteenth century,
when commercial relationships became more complex, cbntracting parties more re-
mote, and the agency device more frequently used, the doctrine of an implied war-
ranty of authority on the part of the agent was formulated.3 This doctrine, intended
to furnish greater protection to promisees who had no personal contacts with their
obligors, had especial utility in cases where the agent could not be termed a party to
the contract and could not be held liable on grounds of knowing misrepresentation or
concealment of the true extent of his authority to bind his principal. The application
of the implied warranty may generally be rationalized on the theory that a loss caused
by the immunity of the principal should be allocated, as between two innocent parties,
to the one in the better position to prevent its occurrence.4 Consequently, the agent,
possessing superior ability to determine the scope of his authority and the existence
and capacity of his principal, should bear the burden of so doing. Although the
boundaries of this doctrine, are not yet clearly defined, it has regularly been applied
in three types of cases. It is utilized most frequently where the agent has acted be-
yond the scope of his authority.5 Similarly he is also said to be guilty of a breach of
warranty when he has contracted for a nonexistent principal.0 Thus, a promotor
1. Ballou v. Talbot, 16 Mass. 461 (1820); Mendelsohn v. Holton, 253 Mass. 362, 149
N. E. 38 (1925); RESTATE-ENT, AGENCY (1933) § 330.
2. 2 CLrRx & SYLEs, ArENcY (1905) 1273; 1 MECHZi, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1395;
STORY, AGENCY (9th ed. 1882) §§ 264, 264a; 1 WILLIsToN, CONTRACTS (1920) § 282; Rz-
STATEmE T, AGENCY (1933) § 320-327; (1926) 42 A. L. R. 1310; Ogden v. Raymond, 22
Conn. 379, 385 (1853); Terwilliger v. Murphy, 104 Ind. 32, 3 N. E. 404 (1885); Richle v.
Bass, 15 La. Ann. 668 (1860); Long v. Colburn, 11 Mass. 97 (1814); Pratt v, Beaupre, 13
Minn. 178 (1868); Dusenberry v. Ellis, 3 Johns. Ch. 70 (N. Y. 1802); White v. Madison,
26 N. Y. 117, 123 (1862); Weiss v. Baum, 218 App. Div. 83, 217 N. Y. Supp. 820 (2d
Dep't, 1926); O'Rourke v. Geary, 207 Pa. 240, 56 AfU. 541 (1903); Clark v. Foster, 8 Vt.
98 (1836); see Downman v. Jones, 9 jurist 454, 458 (1845).
3. Cohen v. Wright, 8 E. & B. 647 (1857).
4. See Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 38* Y= L. J.
584, 720.
5. 1 MA xzs, AGENcY (2d ed. 1914) §§ 1374, 1398; REINSTATEMENT, AozNCY (1933)
§ 328; SToRY, AGENCY (9th ed. 1882) § 264; Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467, 469 (1873);
Le Roy v. Jacobosky, 136 N. C. 443, 48 S. E. 796 (1904); Farmers' Cooperative Trust Co.
v. Floyd, 47 Ohio St. 525, 26 N. E. 110 (1890); Oliver v. Morawetz, 97 Wis. 332, 72 N. W.
877 (1897) ; Oliver v. Bank of England [1902) 1 Ch.. 610. There is no liability, of course,
on the implied warranty theory if the other party is in possession of all the facts as to
the agent's authority. RESTATEmENT, AGENCY (1933) § 329, Comment (g),
6. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 329, Comment (b): "The rule . . . applies ... even
though the agent had been previously authorized to act but, owing to an event of which
he had no notice, the authority has terminated, as where the principles dies. . . ." But one
English case, Smout v. Illbery, 10 M. & W. 1 (1843), holds thaO when the non-existence of
may be held responsible for the nonperformance of a contract made in the name of a
corporation which had not yet been organized.7 Finally, a warranty is implied when
the contract was void because of the principal's total incapacity to enter into such an
agreement. Hence an agent is liable when he purports to bind a corporation upon an
ultra vires contract, provided the other party did not have constructive notice of the
extent of the corporate power 8 The same result follows when the principal is in-
sane,9 or, in those states prohibiting the contracts of married women, is under cover-
ture.j o
In a recent case it was sought to invoke the implied warranty doctrine in order to
hold an agent liable upon the disaffirmance of an executed contract by an infant
principal. A minor purchased stock through an agent and, some time afterward, when
the shares presumably had fallen in value, elected to repudiate the contract. She
brought suit for restitution of the full purchase price, offering to return the certificates
and all dividends received. Thereupon the broker who had sold the shares sought to
recover from the agent the damages which he would suffer if the infant's suit were
successful,"1 on the theory that the agent impliedly had warranted not only that he
was acting with the authority of an existent principal who had the capacity to make
the contract, but also that that principal had no privilege of disafrmance. The
court, however, refused to imply such a warranty and held that, in the absence of
the principal is caused by death, unknown to the agent, the latter is not liable for breach
of implied warranty of authority, since the fact of death is equally within the knowledge
of both parties. Cf. Aspinwall v. Torrance, 1 Lans. 381 (N. Y. 1869); Snow v. Hix, 54
Vt. 428, 482 (1882); STORy, AGNcr (9th ed. 1882) § 265a.
However, Smout v. Ilbery has apparently been overruled by Yonge v. Toynbee (1910]
1 K. B. 215, which indicates that there would be liability even where the principal has
died, unknown to the agent.
7. 1 ME =ca , AGENcY (2d ed. 1914) § 1333; Heisin v. Churchill, 205 Fed. 363 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1913) (corporation never organized); Morse v. Illotson & Wolcott Co, 253 Fed.
340 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); Brisacher v. Baier, 67 Cal. App. 96, 226 Pac. 830 (1924); Wells
v. Fay and Egan Co., 143 Ga. 732, 85 S. E. 873 (1915) (corporation formed and goods
delivered to it); Desplaines Safety Deposit Co. v. Bour, 192 Ill. App. 569 (1919) (cor-
poration subsequently organized); Lagrong v. Timmerman, 46 S. C. 372 (1895); cf. Cot-
tentin v. Meyer, 80 N. J. Law 52, 76 Atl. 341 (1910) (promoter liable on theory that he
adopted corporate name as his own trade name). Contra: Durgin v. Smith, 133 Mich.
331, 94 N. W. 1044 (1903).
8. Seeberger v. McCormick, 178 Ill. 404, 53 N. E. 340 (1899); Farmers' Trust Co. v.
Floyd, 47 Ohio St. 525, 26 N. E. 110 (1890); Firbank's Adm'r v. Humphreys, 18 Q. B.
Div. 54 (1886); 1 Mfxcmr, AGENcy (2d ed. 1914) § 1386. Where, however, the excel3
of corporate power is apparent from an examination of the charter, statutes, or other public
acts of which the contracting party was charged with knowledge as a matter of law, the
agent is not liable. Thimany v. Iowa Paper Bag Co., 103 Iowa 357, 79 N. W. 261 (1899);
Abeles v. Cochran, 22 Kan. 405 (1879); Sandford v. McArthur, 57 Ky. 411 (1857); Whit-
tendon Mills v. Upton, 76 Mass. 582, 598 (1858); McCarty v. Love, 145 Mis. 330, 110 So.
795 (1927). But cf. Richardson v. Williamson, L. R. 6 Q. B. 276 (1871).
9. Yonge v. Toynbee [1910] 1 K. B. 215.
10. 1 MAcBai, AGNcz (3d ed. 1914) § 1393.
11. The broker's claim was contained in a supplemental complaint, filed by way of
answer to the infant's petition. Naw Yoam Civi PRAcnca Acr, § 193(2); Travlos v.
Commercial Union of America, Inc., 217 App. Div. 352, 217 N. Y. Supp. 459 (1st Dep't,
1926); id. 135 Misc. 895, 238 N. Y. Supp. 692 (Sup. Ct. 1930). The dLmLal of the sup-
plemental complaint was the only issue raised on appeal.
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deceit,I2 an agent is not liable when his principal repudiates on the ground of
infancy.1
3
The original rationale of the implied warranty doctrine would be applicable to the
instant case. The agent, who has had some direct dealings with the principal, would
seem to be in a better position to discover the latter's infancy than the other con-
tracting party and would therefore be the proper person to bear the risk of dis-
affirmance. But the wisdom of so applying the warranty doctrine is now open to
serious question. The complexity of modem commercial relationships, wherein
agents play an increasingly greater part, would seem to require a limitation upon the
agent's liability. With the development of certain types of agency almost to the
proportions of common callings, as for example, the stockbroker who holds himself
out to act for all comers, there is little opportunity for the agent to become per-
sonally familiar with each of his numerous principals. These conditions lessen the
present strength of the assumption that the agent is in a better position to prevent a
loss due to the failure to bind his principal; and they thus may make it undesirable
to extend the implied warranty doctrine to its logical extreme, where the agent would
become an unqualified insurer of his principals' continuing responsibility and con-
tractual capacity.
There is ample legalistic basis for immunizing the agent from the loss caused by
contract repudiations of infants and for leaving the loss on the other contracting party,
if this be deemed the preferable business policy. There appears to be a tendency to
restrict the agent's obligation to a warranty that the contract was valid against the
principal as of the time when it was made, and to place upon the other contracting
party the risk of defects that may subsequently appear. Thus, for example, it has
been held that an agent does not warrant the continued solvency of his principal. 14
In cases of infancy, such as the instant case, the principal, although not yet sul juris,
is not under a disability to appoint an agent,15 or to contract, since the agreements of
infants are merely voidable, and not void. Therefore, the contract is valid at its
inception,'0 and only becomes ineffective by the infant's later exercise of his power to
disaffirm. Furthermore, even if the infant's disaffirmance of the purchase contract
constitutes a disaffirmance of the agency, such a repudiation may be said not to relate
back so as to render the agency and the purchase void ab initio.17 Accordingly, as
12. In the instant case the agent was the father of the infant principal. But the court
held that, since the relationship was not disclosed by the pleadings, and since there had
been no allegation that the agent knew or had reason to know of the principal's nonage,
there was no evidence of deceit.
13. Goldfinger v. Doherty, 276 N. Y. Supp. 289 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
14. 1 MEcErir, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1388.
15. Towle v. Dresser, 73 Me. 252 (1882); Benson v. Tucker, 212 Mass. 60, 98 N. E.
S589 (1912); Coursalle v. Weyerhauser, 69 Minn. 328, 72 N. W. 697 (1897); Patterson v,
Lippincott, 47 N. J. Law 457 (1885) ; Casey v. Kastel, 237 N. Y. 305, 142 N. E. 671 (1924) ;
1 W =s rON, CONTRACTS (1920) 444; 1 MErCHE, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1392; Com-
ment (1923) 8 Com. L. Q. 162; Comment (1924) 24 CoL. L. REv, 60. For the older rule
contra, see McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52, 120 N. E. 476, 478 (1918);
Pyle v. Cravens, 14 Ky. 17, 21 (1823); Armitage v. Widoe, 36 Mich. 124, 129 (1877);
Fonda v. Van Home, 15 Wend. 631, 635 (N. Y. 1836); Lawrence v. McArter, 10 Ohio
37, 42 (1840); Knox v. Flack, 22 Pa. 337 (1853); Gillespie v. Bailey, 12 W. Va, 80, 89
(1877).
16. See AxsoN, CONmTAcS (Corbin's ed. 1930) §§ 157-162.
17. Joseph v. Schatzkin, 259 N. Y. 241, 181 N. E. 464 (1932). Cf. Jones v. Hodgkins,
61 Me. 480 (1872) (agent not liable until notified of revocation of authority); Bosak v.
Parrish, 252 N. Y. 212, 169 N. E. 280 (1929) ; (revocation of authority effective only after
communication by principal to other contracting party).
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indicated by the Restatement, in the infancy cases as well as in the insolvency cases
a warranty by the agent need not be implied.' 8
The refusal of the court in the instant case to broaden the scope of the implied
warranty doctrine and impose liability on the agent may, therefore, be justified. On
the other hand, should it be deemed the wiser business policy in some instances to
shift the burden of loss to the agent in cases of this nature, even though his oppor-
tunity of preventing that loss may be only slightly, if at all, greater than that of the
seller, the reasoning outlined above can be escaped by noting an obvious distinction
between the insolvency cases and those involving infancy. In the former group, sub-
sequent events, necessarily not ascertainable and not predictable by even the most
diligent of agents, are often to blame for the eventual irresponsibility of the principal
and the consequent non-performance of the contract. But in the infancy cases, the
fact which later results in the principal's irresponsibility can be as easily discovered by
the agent at the time when the contract is entered into as at any subsequent time.
Since the only reason for making the rule of implied warranty inapplicable to sub-
sequently appearing defects, such as insolvency, is that the agent and the third party
have an equal opportunity to discover such defects at the time of forming the con-
tract, the defect of infancy can be regarded as not falling within the reason of that
exception.
It is apparent that the imposition of the loss on either the agent or the seller is an
unsatisfactory solution to the implied warranty problem. Actually, both parties prob-
ably were misled as to the principal's age and were equally innocent. The dilemma
created by the necessity of allocating a loss to one of two innocent parties should be
avoided wherever possible by eliminating the loss itself. In the instant case, this
could be accomplished by use of the direct and equitable remedy of curtailing the
infant's power to repudiate an executed contract. The ancient doctrine allowing an
infant to escape contractual responsibility by disaffirming any bargain not for neces-
saries, whether executory or performed, fair or fraudulent, advantageous or im-
provident, has broken down to an appreciable extent. While most jurisdictions still
allow an infant, even though he has squandered or destroyed what be has received
under a contract, to recover the consideration paid without making restitution,' 9
18. "An agent does not warrant that his principal has full contractual capacity any more
than he warrants that his principal is solvent. Thus, an agent for one not of legal age is
not necessarily liable if the infant avoids the obligations of the contract made on his
account." REsTAnar-Nr, AGrE.vcy (1933) § 332, Comment a. However, there have keen
no previous cases on the point. But see 1 Mxc==, AGoEcr (2d ed. 1914) § 1392: "It
may well be open to question whether a third person dealing with an agent has not the
right to assume that the agent undertakes to deal for a principal having normal capacity
to contract.'
19. Eureka Co. v. Edwards, 71 Ala. 248 (1831); Story & Clark Piano Co. v. Davy, 63 Ifl.
App. 150, 119 N. E. 177 (1918); Walker v. Walker, 253 Ky. 378, 69 S. W. (2d) 716
(1934); Utterstrom v. Myron D. Kidder, Inc., 124 MBe. 10, 124 AtL. 72S (1924); Chandler v.
Simmons, 97 Mass. 508, 514 (1867); Gillis v. Goodman, 180 Mas. 140, 61 N. E. 813
(1901); Craig v. Van Bibber, 100 Mo. 584, 13 S. W. 906 (1890); Green v. Green, 69 N. Y.
553 (1877); Wyatt v. Lortscher, 217 App. Div. 224, 216 N. Y. Supp. $71 (4th Dep',
1926); Collins v. Norfleet-Baggs, Inc., 197 N. C. 659, 150 S. E. 177 (1929); see Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of X. Y. v. Schiavone, 71 F. (2d) 980 (App. D. C. 1934). These cases are
based on the theory that it was this very improvidence against which the voidability of
an infant's contracts was intended to protect him. Note (1929) 77 U. or P%. L. Rnv. 811.
However, it would seem to be the purpose, rather, to protect him against being induced
into disadvantageous contracts, in accordance with the English rule which allows only such
agreements to be diLsffirmed.
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nevertheless this stringent doctrine has in many states been relaxed in favor of the
modem attitude that, in case of part or complete performance by the other contract-
ing party, some degree of restitution should be a condition precedent to the infant's
right to rescind.2° Even under the old rule, if he is in possession of the actual res
delivered to him, this must be returned.21 A few jurisdictions compel restoration
of an equivalent consideration, if he has disposed of the property for value.22 Other
states, even more liberal, deduct the beneficial value of the infant's use of the goods28
or the amount of the depreciation resulting from use,24 from the amount which he
may recover after tender of the property. While the modem cases which require a
deduction for depreciation have involved depreciation of tangible chattels caused by
actual use, reason would seem to favor the extension of this rule to cover deprecia-
tion of intangibles caused merely by decline in market price. The infant, who would
have received the benefit if the property had risen in value, would then bear the loss
attendant upon its depreciation, thus avoiding the problem of which of two innocent
parties to penalize, any solution of which is necessarily unsatisfactory.
20. "If an infant pays money on his contract and enjoys the benefit of it and then
avoids it when he becomes of age, he cannot recover back the consideration paid .... The
privilege of infancy is to be used as a shield, not a sword. He cannot have the benefit of
the contract on one side without returning the equivalent on the other." 2 KNT, Comtu.
(1889) 240. See also Comment (1928) 2 So. CAL.. L. Rxv. 71; Note (1900) 6 VA. L.
REG;. 115; Comment (1930) 16 VA. L. Rav. 710, 712..
21. Weeks v. Berschauer, 36 P. (2d) 81 (Kan. 1934); McCormick v. Crotts, 198 N. C,
664, 153 S. E. 152, 153 (1930); cf. MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U. S. 688 (1897) (where
an infant borrowed to pay off liens on her property, she was held to be in possession
of the specific fruits of the contract, and the other party is subrogated to those prior
liens) ; see also cases cited in notes 19 supra, and 22, 23, 24 infra.
22. Bailey v. Bamberger, 50 Ky. 113 (1850); Whitman v. Allen, 123 Me. 1, 121 Atl.
160 (1923); Kerr v. Bell, 44 Mo. 120 (1869); cf. Ex Parte Taylor, 8 Do G., M. & G. 254
(1856); Valentine v. Canali, 24 Q. B. D. 166 (1889); Pearce v. Brain, [19291 2 K. B, 310;
1 WaTs roN, CON.TRACrS (1920) 461.
23. Rice Auto Co. v. Spellman, 280 Fed. 452, 454 (App. D. C. 1922); Berglund v.
American Multigraph Sales Co., 135 Minn. 67, 160 N. IV. 191 (1916); Hall v. Butterfield,
59 N. H. 354 (1879); Wooldridge v. Lavoie, 79 N. H. 21, 104 Ati. 346 (1918); Rice v.
Butler, 160 N. Y. 578, 55 N. E. 275 (1899); Joseph v. Schatzkin, 259 N. Y. 241, 181
N. E. 464 (1932) (an infant "is not entitled to retain an advantage from a transaction
which he repudiates"); Egnaczyk v. Rowland, 148 Misc. 889, 267 N. Y. Supp. 14 (County
Ct. 1933). Contra: Creer v. Active Automobile Exchange, 99 Conn. 266, 121 Atl 888
(1923) (infant must restore other party to his original position, but need not allow cony-
pensation for use).
24. Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U. S. 18 (1927) (infant should be forced "to do
equity, which may extend to compelling him to make full satisfaction for the deterioration
of the property due to his use or abuse of it") ; noted with approval in 7 B. U. L. Rav. -307,
16 GEO. L. J. 124, 21 L.L. L. REv. 810, 26 Micn. L. Rv. 107, 28 Micir. L. Rav. 791, 7 Tmm.
L. REv. 58, 5 Tax. L. REV. 434, 75 U. of PA. L. Rav. 570. To the same effect see Murdock v.
Fisher Finance Corp., 79 Cal. App. 787, 251 Pac. 319, 320 (1926), approved in (1927) 15
CALi. L. REv. 262; Toon v. Mack Truck Co., 54 Cal. App. 1011, 262 Pac. 51 (1927); Sparan-
dera v. Staten Island Garage, Inc., 117 Misc. 780, 193 N. Y. Supp. 392 (Mun. Ct. 1921);
Pettit v. Liston, 97 Ore. 464, 191 Pac. 660 (1920).
APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX WHERE THE DECEASED RETAINm, A
CONTINGENT REVERSIONARY INTEREST
DECEASED'S life was insured under a paid-up policy, on which he had surrendered
all right to change the beneficiary, borrow, or receive the cash surrender value.
Upon his death the proceeds were to be paid to his wife, or, if she predeceased him,
to his children; but if they all predeceased him, then the proceeds were to go to his
personal representatives. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue sought to include
this policy in the deceased's estate for purposes of the federal estate tax, under the
section of the Revenue Act which provides that "the amount receivable by the ex-
ecutor as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life, and
by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon
his own life" shall be included in the gross estate of the decedent as a transfer to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at death.' The Court of Claims upheld the
Commissioner's contention on the ground that the death of the insured was the
"indispensable event giving rise to or enlarging valuable property rights not there-
tofore possessed or enjoyed." The court pointed out that no absolute right was
acquired by the beneficiaries during the lifetime of the insured, since their "vested
interests" in the proceeds would be divested by their prior death.2 In a case in-
volving the identical problem, a federal district court held that the proceeds of the
policy were not to be included in the insured's estate, on the ground that he had
retained no control over them, that the beneficiary's interest v'as vested before he
.died, and that all interest passed from the insured to the beneficiary inter vivos
rather than at death.3
It seems obvious that all gratuitous transfers of property by individuals must be
either inter vivos or intended to "take effect in possession and enjoyment at or
after death." Thus, the issue in these cases is whether or not there is any "transfer"
at death which can be taxed, since it would be unconstitutional to tax as part of
the deceased's estate what had passed to another inter vivos. Each time Congress
and the courts succeed in crystallizing the definition of what transactions shall be
included in the taxable group, a differently formulated instrument is developed for
the purpose of avoiding taxation at death, thus raising the problem anew. For
instance, shortly before the death of the insured in the instant case, the Supreme
Court had held that the proceeds of an insurance policy in which the insured retained
the right to change the beneficiary were part of the insured's estate, and therefore
that there was a taxable transfer at death.4  On the other hand, in May v. Heinfr
the corpus of a trust in which the only interest reserved to the settlor was the right
to receive the income for life if she survived her husband, was held not to be part
of the estate of the settlov and hence not to pass at death within the meaning of
the act.L5 When the Court displayed an intention to adhere to this ruling, by hold-
ing that the reservation of a life estate did not render the corpus taxable g Congress
1. Revenue Act of 1926, Sec. 302 (g), 44 STAr. 71, Z6 U. S. C. A. § 1094 (g) (1926).
The constitutionality of this provision if applied to the interests involved in this casz is
the question at issue.
2. Industrial Trust Co. v. U. S., 9 F. Supp. 817 (Ct. Cl. 1935).
3. Ballard v. Helburn, 9 F. Supp. 812 (W. D. Ky. 1934). Cf. Parker v. Commi3-
sioner, 30 B. T. A. 342 (1934); Sharp v. Commissioner, 30 B. T. A. 532 (1934).
4. Chase Nat. Bank v. U. S., 278 U. S. 327 (1929).
5. 281 U. S. 238 (1930).
6. McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 784 (1931); Mforsman v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 73
(1931); Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U. S. 782 (1931), all decided on the Same
day on the authority of May v. Heiner, without opinion.
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quickly closed the gap with an amendment to the Revenue Act.
1  Again, when the
Court decided that the corpus of a trust which the settlor alone could revoke was
part of the settlor's estate at death,8 the framers of trust instruments, hoping to
avoid the tax, immediately added the requirement that one of the beneficiaries had
to consent to the revocation. 9 Although requiring his wife's or child's consent is
a doubtful check on the settloer's control, the Court held that the presence of this
adverse interest removed the corpus of the trust from the taxable sphere.10 Where
the settlor retains a reversionary interest, so that the death of all the named bene-
ficiaries before him would result in the return of the corpus to him or his estate,
the Court has held in one unanimous decision that there is a sufficient transfer at
death to render it taxable." However, a per curiam opinion of the court held
otherwise on the authority of May v. Heiner in a case where, although the court
did not expressly take the factor of remoteness into consideration, nevertheless the
possibility of the reversion's taking effect was in fact very remote.1 "  Then two
years later, in the Duke case, it was held, in a four to four decision affirming the
lower court, that this retention of a reversionary interest was not sufficient to justify
the tax.13
In reaching their decisions in these cases, some of the judges consider primarily
concepts of ownership found in property law; others are influenced primarily by
the existence or lack of control reserved by the settlor; still others, repeating the
dictum that taxation is purely a practical matter, merely try to find if there is any
change in beneficial interest, however slight. For instance, where a husband cre-
ated a trust for his wife, with the provision that the corpus should revert to him
if she predeceased him, the Court held that since, according to the law of the state
in which the trust was established, the wife had only a contingent interest, the
corpus was part of the husband's estate when he died.14  Similarly, one lower
court distinguished a prior decision solely on the ground that there the settlor ex-
pressly retained title to the property in himself, while in the case at hand he retained
only a possibility of reverter.' 5  Sometimes the fact that the settlor has retained
no control over the distribution of income or corpus, or over the time of termination
of the trust, induces a court to hold it not taxable.16 Oni the other hand, in many
cases in which the interest is technically vested, or vested subject to be divested,
7. 46 STAT. 1516 (1931), 26 U. S. C. A. 1094 (1934), enacted the day following the
handing down of the decisions cited in note 6, supra.
8. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929).
9. Merely requiring the consent of a trustee is not sufficient "adverse interest" to
exempt it. See Witherbee v. Commissioner, 70 F. (24) 696 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert.
den. 293 U. S. 582, 631 (1934).
10. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 346 (1929).
11. Klein v. U. S., 283 U. S. 231 (1931).
12. McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 784 (1931), rev'g 43 F. (2d) 277 (C. C. A. 7th,
1930). The Supreme Court decision appeared approximately five weeks before the Klein
case, but it ignored the issue raised by the lower court and treated as controlling in there.
13. Helvering v. Duke, 290 U. S. 591 (1933), aff'g 62 F. (2d) 1057 (C. C. A, 3d, 1933)
and 23 B. T. A. 1104 (1931), the Board's decision coming just three months after the
Klein case, supra note 11.
14. Klein v. U. S., 283 U. S. 231, 233 (1931). Cf. Helvering v. Wallace, 27 B. T A.
902 (1933), aff'd 71 F. (2d) 1002 (C. C. A4 2d, 1934),, cert. den. 293 U. S. 600 (1934).
15. Safe Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Tait, 7 F. Supp. 40, 45 (D. Md.
1934).
16. See James B. Duke, 23 B. T. A. 1104, 1114 (1931).
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but irrevocable and beyond the control of the settlor with regard to the power
to change any beneficial interests, the tax has been upheld. This occurred, for ex-
ample, in the cases which allowed the tax if the settlor retained a life interest in
the income for himself.17 These holdings have been based on the "economic bane-
fit" theory, which has been applied in most of the recent death tax cases. Under
this theory, courts decline to permit their decisions in matters of taxation to be de-
termined by the application of concepts from other branches of law and by the
"refinements of title" found in property law. Rather, in deciding if there has been
a transfer at death, they look to see if death has been the "generating force" bringing
about some change in the beneficial interests involved, as, for instance, the termina-
tion of a power in the settlor, the cutting off of a possibility of reverter, or the
creation of a larger estate for the beneficiary. If there is found such a change in
the beneficial interests, then the tax is imposed.1 8  It has been held that the basis
of measurement of the tax need not be the precise economic value of the interest
which has been retained by the deceased until death and thereafter passed to the
beneficiary, for the subject of the tax is not the economic value of that interest,
but rather the transfer. Once it is found that there is a transfer the measure of the
tax is the entire sum transferred, it being immaterial that part of the benefit from
that sum passed before death.' 9
In all the cases it is clear that there is an attempt on the part of the settlor to
effect a transfer to his family of as much of his estate as possible without having
it materially depleted by the death taxes. At the same time he desires to retain
during his lifetime as much control over the property involved as he can. If there
were no death taxes, most wealthy persons would not resort to intricately planned
trusts of various kinds, and there is every reason to believe that the present bene-
ficiaries of the trusts would still be left practically the came amounts at death. The
estate would be allowed to pass in the customary manner, which, in the case of
those who now establish trusts for the family, would probably be by will in favor of
the same persons. The prior decease of the latter would leave the spouse or
parent free to dispose of the estate at will, as in the case of a reversionary interest
in a trust. Therefore, the ultimate practical result of the settlor's establishment
of a trust for his wife and children, with the provision that if they all predecease
him the corpus shall revert to him, is substantially the same as leaving the property
by will to his family. This is even more true, of course, where a life interest
in the income is retained by the settlor and where the settlor himself is a trustee.::0
17. May v. Heiner, 32 F. (2d) 1017 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929) and 25 F. (2d) 104 (W. D.
Pa. 1928), rev'd, 281 U. S. 238 (1930); Commissioner v. Morsman, 44 F. (2d) 932 (C.
C. A. Sth, 1930), rev'd 283 U. S. 783 (1931). A recent amendment to the act expreszly
taxes such interests, but it is somewhat difficult to see how this can make a transaction
which has been held not to be a "transfer at death" into one that is. [46 Sr.%r. 1516
(1931), 26 U. S. C. A. 1094 (1934)].
18. See Tyler v. U. S., 281 U. S. 497, 502 (1930); Klein v. U. S., 233 U. S. 231, 234
(1931); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103, 110 (1932); Burnet v. Wells, 2S9 U. S. 670,
678 (1933); Commissioner v. McCormick, 43 F. (2d) 277 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), rev'd 203
U. S. 784 (1931); Chase Nat. Bank v. U. S., 278 U. S. 327, 334 (1929); Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929).
19. See Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Comm'sioner, 72 F. (2d) 197, 193 (C. C. A.
8th, 1934), cert. den. 293 U. S. 604, 631 (1934); Surrey and Aronson, Irter Vivos Trarsfms
and the Federal Estate Tax (1932) 32 COL. L. Ray. 1332, 1348.
20. See, for instance, the trusts involved in Witherbee v. Commisioner, 70 F. (2d)
696 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. den. 293 U. S. 582, 631 (1934), and Safe Depazit and
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Since taxation is said to be a purely practical matter,21 it seems inconsistent to
allow a person to evade it simply by a few strokes of a pen where the creation
of the new interest makes no practical difference in the result as far as the estate
is concerned and where it is possible to find a shift of economic benefit at death.
However, in the case of a wholly irrevocable trust in which the settler retains
no interest, contingent or otherwise, the effect may be quite different from a transfer
at death. In such a case the beneficiary, and not the settlor, has the power to
decide upon the disposition of the property in case of the prior death of the bene-
ficiary. However, if the death of the settler is the date at which the trust is to
terminate, and the corpus to go to the cestui, then by carrying the "economic bene-
fit" theory to a logical conclusion, it may be held that this increased benefit to the
latter is sufficient to place the corpus in the taxable group without offending any
constitutional provisions. On the other hand, if the death of the settler does not
mark the point at which a change occurs, then there can not be said to be a transfer
at death.
22
In applying this reasoning to the principal case, it is necessary first to recall the
theory under which the Revenue Act includes in the decedent's estate the value of
insurance taken out on his own life. Insurance is simply a method of building an
estate by the investment of periodic savings. As pointed out in Burnet v. Wellsp
to do this for the benefit of one's family is more and more considered the duty
of every man. Also, since the proceeds of the policy in the instant case were ex-
pressly to, revert to the insured's estate if the beneficiaries predeceased him, it takes
on even more the appearance of an alternative method of reaching the normal result
desired by most persons when they die. The effect, from the practical point of
view, would have been the same if the insured had made periodic investments in
various securities, and willed them to the surviving members of his family. Fur-
thermore, the death of the insured was the "indispensable event" needed to bring
about the realization of the economic benefit by the beneficiaries, and to cut off the
possibility of reversion to the estate of the insured. Therefore it seems clear that
the transaction may be held to be within the scope of the section of the act which
taxes "transfers" to "take effect in possession and enjoyment at or after death."
Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Tait, 7 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mr. 1934). Probably the best examples
are the Duke trusts (23 B. T. A. 1104, 1105 (1931) where the settler, Mr. Duke, retained
a reversionary interest in the corpus of the trust in case his daughter, the beneficiary,
should predecease him. No other interest was retained by him, nor, as the court said,
any "control." But he was the trustee, and he retained full control over the investments.
If the estate could be imagined as following a predetermined course in the ordinary run
of events from parent to child, certainly the drawing up of the instruments of trust,
involving no more than a third of this vast estate, had no practical effect in this case
at all.
21. See Tyler v. U. S., 281 U. S. 497, 503 (1930).
22. See Shukert v. Allen, 273 U. S. 545 (1927). . Strict logic requires that the transfer
must be subject either to the gift tax when made, or to the estate tax upon the death
of the transferor. Whenever it is held to be an inter vivos transfer, the subject of the
transfer must be held to be part of the estate of the transferee or beneficiary. Upon
the latter's death, the interest then should be taxed as part of his estate-even though It
reverts to the settlor by the provisions of the original instrument. This seemingly leads
to certain obvious absurdities, especially where the beneficiary who predeceases the settler
is the beneficiary of an insurance policy on the life of the one to whom the interest now
reverts, as in the principal case.
23. 289 U. S. 670, 682 (1933).
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APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK RuL. AGAINST ExcEssrvE CHARITABLE REz='.rADzrs
A TESTATRIX who died in 1932, survived by her husband, left a total estate, less
debts, of $78,031.85. Her will, after providing for legacies of $450 to certain
individuals and a legacy of $10,000 to her husband, directed that a trust be created
of the residue for the benefit of her husband during his life with the remainder to
three specified charities in equal shares. Section 17 of the New York Decedent Estate
Law provides that no person leaving a husband, wife, child, descendant or parent may
devise or bequeath to charity more than one-half of his estate after the payment of
debts, and by an amendment added in 1929 specifies that in computing the one-half
that charity may receive, no allowance shall be made for any postponement of the de-
vise or bequest, or for any interest or gains accruing after the testator's death.' In
the instant case the husband contested the validity of the testamentary gift of the
remainder in the corpus of the trust to the charities as in violation of this statute. To
ascertain whether the will violated Section 17 as amended, the court deducted the
legacies of $10,450 and the administration expenses of $4,997.20 from the net estate
of $78,031.85, the difference of $62,584.65 being the corpus of the trust, and computed
the present value of the husband's life estate in this corpus to be $25,217.86, which
deducted from the corpus leaves $37,366.79 as the present value of the remainder to
the charities. Since one-half the net estate was $39,015.92, the court held that Section
17 was not violated and that "the charities are entitled to the entire remainder on the
termination of the trust,"'2 that is, $62,584.65.
Prior to the amendment of 1929, the courts interpreted Section 17 as permitting
charity to receive at the life tenant's death not merely a remainder in one-half the
net estate as of the date of the testator's death, but a remainder the present value of
which at the testator's death did not exceed one-half of the net estate. Thus, if a
testator left a net estate of $100,000, charity could receive a remainder not in merely
$50,000, but in such greater sum as would have a present value at the testators death
of $50,000.3 In applying the statute thus interpreted to a case, for example, where the
entire remainder after a life estate was bequeathed to charity, after first ascertaining
the amount of the principal fund of the life estate, the courts then computed the pres-
ent value of the life estate in that principal fund. This present value was deducted
from the amount of the principal fund and the difference was the present value of the
charitable remainder,4 which was then used as the criterion to determine whether or
not Section 17 had been violated. If this present value did not exceed one-half the
net estate at the testator's death, the charity was permitted to receive the whole re-
1. N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229, § 3.
2. Estate of Flora Q. Lord, N. Y. L. J., far. 21, 1935, at 1444, cols. 6, 7 (Surr. Ct.).
3. Such an additional allowance is proper, because if the income from the estate were ac-
cumulated during the life tenancy, just as the total estate at the end of that period would
be worth more than $100,000, so also one-half of the estate would exceed $50,C00.
4. Hollis v. Drew Theological Seminary, 95 N. Y. 166 (1834);. Matter of Durand, 194
N. Y. 477, 87 N. E. 677 (1909), 127 App. Div. 945, 111 N. Y. Supp. 1118 (1903); Matter
of Shiman, 130 Aisc. 716, 224 N. Y. Supp. 363 (Surr. CL 1927). To ascertain the principal
fund of the life estate, the entire estate was treated as turned into cash as of the date of the
testator's death and from it were deducted all non-charitable items such as legacies, statu-
tory allowances, and administration expenses. Then by the use of the annuity tables, b a d
on the American Experience Mortality Table, which give the present value of an immediate
annuity on a single life at 57 interest, the present value of the life estate was calculated,
which present amount deducted from the principal fund gave the present value of the chari-
table remainder. A simple method of determining the present value of the remainder would
be to use the single premium tables, thereby omitting the intermediate step of ascertaining
the present value of the life estate.
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mainder.5 But if the present value of that remainder exceeded one-half the net estate
at the testator's death, thereby violating the statute, the gift to charity was reduced to
the prescribed one-half of the net estate, the undisposed of excess passing by intestacy.
In such cases, to ascertain the future value of the remainder which chirity at the life
tenant's death could legally receive, the New York courts might have held that charity
could actually receive a remainder the present value of which was one-half the net
estate at the testator's death.6 But instead, the New York courts computed the future
value of the remainder by permitting charity to receive one-half the net estate at the
testator's death plus interest at 5% compounded annually during the life estate, this
compound interest being described as "compensation" to the charity for the postpone-
ment of its enjoyment of the gift.7 While both these methods actually reach substan-
tially the same results,8 nevertheless the New York courts in making use of the second
method misleadingly described the allowance of interest to the charity as "compensa-
tion", and thus obscured the fact that charity was merely being given one-half of the
estate9 to which it was entitled under the statute. In no situation under the New York
procedure, either where there was or was not a violation, did charity ever finally re-
ceive an amount greater than one-half of the estate; yet this use of the compound in-
terest computation in the situation where the statute had been violated, and its judi-
cial description as "compensation" to the charity, led in 1929 to a proposal by the
Commission to Investigate Defects in the Laws of Estates to amend Section 17. Feel-
ing that the allowance of compound interest resulted in materially reducing the excess
over one-half which passed by intestacy, and possibly believing that such an allowance
gave charity more than its prescribed one-half portion,' 0 the Commission recommended
S. Matter of Bullard, 130 Misc. 337, 224 N. Y. Supp. 366 (1927), aff'd 225 App, Div.
734, 232 N. Y. Supp. 706 (1928), aff'd without opinion, 253 N. Y. 562, 171 N. E. 783 (1930) ;
Matter of Strang, 121 App. Div: 112, 105 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1927); Matter of Shtman, 130
Misc. 716, 224 N. Y. Supp. 363 (Surr. C't. 1927).
6. The future value of one-half the net estate at the testator's death would be worked
out by the use of the single premium tables derived from the American Experience Mortality
Tables. For tables, see Wor.E, Ix =AxcE TAx CALcu.ATIONS (1905) 255.
7. Matter of Seymour, 209 App. Div. 655, 205 N. Y. Supp. 327 (1924), and see 239 N. Y.
259, 262, 146 N. E. 372, 373 (1925). Matter of Suydam, 122 Misc, 340, 203 N. Y. Supp, 911
(Surr. Ct. 1924) ; Matter of Blumenthal, 128 Misc. 56, 217 N. Y. Supp. 316 (Sunr. Ct. 1926) ;
Matter of Loewenthal, 138 Misc. 871, 247 N. Y. Supp. 629 (Surr. Ct. 1931); Matter of
Sloat's Estate, 141 Misc. 710, 253 N. Y. Supp. 215 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
8. The Court of Appeals in Matter of Seymour, 239 N. Y. 259, 262, 146 N. E. 372, 373
(1925) said, "But whether under the circumstances of this case the present value of a legacy
payable in the future is calculated, or whether when the distribution is made upon the death
of the life tenant interest is allowed out of the estate upon the half as it stood at the testa-
tor's death, as the Appellate Division has done here without objection, the result is practi-
cally identical."
Identical results cannot be reached by the two methods because under that using the
single premium tables, the figures in the table are ascertained by a process Involving the
use of a geometrical progression, while under the New York compound interest method the
process used involves only an arithmetical progression See, WoLFe, op, cit. supra, note 6.
9. Wherever the term "estate" is used without qualification as to any specific time, It
means the value of the estate increased by the accumulation of the income derived from It
during the life tenancy. See note 3, supra.
10. It is practically impossible to ascertain just what was in the minds of the members
of the Commission in proposing this amendment. The statement is made int the Reports of
the Commission to Investigate Defects in the Laws of Estates, New York Legislative Docu-
ment (1930), No. 69, at 113, that the rule that the amount of the charity's remainder be
computed as of the date of the testator's death is sought to be retained, but that "any allow-
and the legislature enacted the 1929 amendment to Section 17, prohibiting any allow-
ance to charity for a postponement occasioned by the terms of the will)'
There are two possible interpretations of the amended statute, which differ in their
conceptions of what constitutes a violation of it. The one adopted by the New York
courts is that the words "no allowance . . . for . . . postponement" are to be given
effect only after it has been determined that the provision of the will violates the
statute, as determined on the basis of the procedure used prior to 1929. Thus, where
a net estate worth $100,000 at the testator's death is left to charity by way of remain-
der, if the present value of the charitable remainder is $51,000, there has been a viola-
tion of the statute because charity has been given more than one-half of the net estate
valued as of the testator's death. Effect is given to the amendment in this case with
the result that charity will receive only $50,000 at the life tenant's death. However, if
the present value of the charitable remainder is $49,000 there has been no violation
of the statute. In this case no effect is given to the amendment and charity will receive
the entire remainder worth $100,000 at the life tenant's death. The second possible
interpretation would be that the words "no allowance . . . for... postponement"
are to be given effect in the first instance to decide whether there has been a violation
of the statute. Since the prohibition of allowance for postponement in the amendment
disregards the fact that the value of the estate is being increased durinl the life ten-
ancy by the accumulation of income, the material factor determining whether the
statute is violated under this interpretation would be whether the amount which the
charity will receive at the life tenant's death exceeds one-half the value of the net
estate at the testator's death. This would mean that in both the hypothetical cases
above, since the amount charity will receive at the life tenant's death ($1CD,0D) ex-
ceeds one-half of the net estate at the testator's death ($50,000), there have been vio-
lations of the statute. Hence, in both cases the charities will only be permitted to
receive $50,000 at the life tenant's death. By this analysis, in every situation, charity
will no longer get one-half of the net estate, but some lesser amount, for if $50,000 is
one-half of a net estate of $100,000 at the date of the testator's death, it will only be
one-third or one-fourth of the estate at the life tenant's death.
The application of the New York courts' interpretation of Section 17 as amended to
such situations as that presented by the principal case seems to lead to very unreason-
able results. Thus, in the principal case, once the court decided by its interpretation
that there was no violation of the statute, thq charities were permitted to receive the
entire corpus of the trust, $62,584.65, at the death of the husband, just as they could
ance to the charity by reason of a postponement occasioned by the terms of the will" is
to be avoided. Whie this would seem to indicate that the commissoners intended that, after
1929, charity should always receive an amount less than one-half of the estate, this hypothe-
sis seems to be refuted by the decisions since 1929 written by surrogates who were membars
of the Commission. See Matter of Apple, 141, Misc. 3S0, 252 N. Y. Supp. 550 (Surr. Ct.
1931); Matter of Miranda, 151 Misc. 459, 271 N. Y. Supp. 913 (Surr. Ct. 1934); Estate of
Flora Q_ Lord, N. Y. L. J., Mar. 21, 1935, at 1444, cols. 6, 7 (Surr. Ct.). If the commi-'on-
ers believed that the allowance of compound interest was giving the charity more than its
legal one-half portion, they were overlooking the fact that the allowance of intemt in addi-
tion to one-half the net estate at the death of the testatoe merely gave the charity one-half
the future value of the estate. A possibly valid hypothesis is that in drafting the amendment,
the precise situation such as has arisen in the principal case, was never visualized by the
commissioners. Had it been foreseen, undoubtedly some provision would have been made
for it.
11. N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229, § 3. "When payment of a devise or bequest to such Eciety,
association, corporation or purpose is postponed, in computing the one-half part of such
society, association, corporation or purpose, no allowance may be made for such postpone-
ment or for any interest or gains which may accrue after the testator's death."
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have done prior to the amendment. Therefore, under the courts' theory of what con-
stitutes a violation of the amended statute, one rule is used to determine the amount of
the remainder charity may receive at the life tenant's death, when, as here, there has
been no violation, whereas in other cases in which it was decided that there was a vio-
lation, an entirely different rule is used, by which the charity's share is reduced to the
prescribed one-half of the net estate at the testator's death.12 The great difference in
actual remainders taken by charity in the two situations appears strikingly clear in the
two extreme hypothetical cases above, in both of which it was) assumed that a net
estate of $100,000 had been left to a life tenant, with the remainder to charity. A
slight difference in the life expectancies of the two life tenants in those cases resulted
in a violation of the statute in the one and no violation in the other, Consequently
one charity received $50,000, the other, $100,000. Likewise in the principal case, had
the husband been sixty-six instead of sixty-three years of age when the testatrix died,
the present value of the charitable remainder would have exceeded one-half the present
value of the net estate, and the most that charity could have received at the husband's
death would have been $39,015.92 instead of $62,584.65. Under the second possible
interpretation of the amended statute this unreasonable difference in results is avoided;
and on the actual facts of the principal case, for example, the charities would receive
only $39,015.92 when the husband died.
An additional desirable feature of the second possible interpretation of the amended
statute is that it makes possible the use of future values in computing the excess to
pass by intestacy in the cases where the statute has been violated. Although present
values still could be used, the use of future values affords a much simpler and more
understandable method. On the other hand, the present interpretation of Section 17
accepted by the New York courts involves the retention of the use of present values
in computing the excess to pass by intestacy, thereby creating perplexing difficulties.
Thus, in Matter of Apple, 8 a testatrix by her will gave her husband a life interest in
her net estate of $24,796.96 and directed that at his death remainders aggregating
$4000 be paid to certain individuals, the balance of the remainder to go to three chad.
ties. The husband exercised his statutory right to withdraw $2500,14 leaving $22,296.96
as the principal fund of the life estate. The present value of the husband's life estate
in this fund was calculated to be $5,421.28 and the present value of the remainder in
$4,000 to the individuals to be $3,028. The difference between the sum of these two
amounts and the principal fund is $13,847.68, the present value of the remainder to
the charities. One-half of the net estate at the testatrix's death being $12,398,48, Sec-
tion 17 as amended was held to have been violated and the charities' share was reduced
to the prescribed one-half, the excess passing to the heirs. Determination of the
amount of the excess to pass by intestacy could have been made by the use of future
values or by the use of present values. By the former and less complicated method,
this excess would be reached by deducting from the principal fund of the life estate
($22,296.96) the remainder payable to the individuals ($4,000) and the permissible
remainder to the charities ($12,398.48), leaving an excess of $5,898.48 to pass by
intestacy.15 But in the reported decision present and future values were mixed to-
12. Matter of Apple, 141 Misc. 380, 252 N. Y. Supp. 580 (Surr. Ct. 1931); Matter of
Miranda, 151 Misc. 459, 271 N. Y. Supp. 913 (Surr. Ct. 1934); Matter of City Bank Farm-
er's Trust Co., N. Y. L. J., May 7, 1935, at 2360, col. 6 (Surr. Ct.).
13. 141 Misc. 380, 252 N. Y. Supp. 580 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
14. N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 229, § 4.
15. Substantially this same result can be reached by using only present values. First
the present values of the items validly disposed of should be calculated:
Present value of the husband's life estate in $22,296.96 .................... $9,421.28
Present value of remainder in $4000 to the individuals .................. 3,028.00
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gether so as to lead to an erroneous result. The permissible one-half of the net estate
at testator's death ($12,398.48), which is a future value because of the fact that the
1929 amendment limits charity to taking that amount at the life tenant's death, was
deducted from the present value of the charitable remainder, $13,847.63, to arrive at
an excess of $1,449.20 to pass by intestacy.16 Such a means of calculation leaves sev-
eral thousand dollars undisposed of at the termination of the husband's life estate.
Obviously the permissible one-half going to charity ($12,398.4S), since it is a future
value, should have been reduced to a present value before deducting it from the
$13,847.68, a present value. However, in the final and actual disposition of the case,
this error was not committed, because at that time only future values were used. 7
But this same error, made in Matter of Apple as it was reported, seems to have been
made in the reported decision in Matter of Miranda, where the permissible one-half
to charity, a future value, was apparently deducted from the present value of the
charitable remainder in order to determine the excess to pass by intestacy.18 But there
Present value of permissible remainder in $12,398.48 to charity .... ..... 9,383.81
Statutory allowance to husband (a present value because taken outright) .... 2,5D.0
Validly disposed of by will and by statutory allowance .................... $20,333.50
The difference between $24,796.96, the principal fund of the estate, and this amount of
$20,333.09 is $4,463.87 which represents the present value of the remainder in the exces
above one-half the estate. In other words at the death of the husband $4,463.87 will be
worth $5,898A8. (Because of the peculiarities inherent in the New York method of com-
puting the value of remainders, $4,463.87 will be worth slightly more than $,893A3 at the
husband's death).
16. Since the husband was the sole statutory successor of the testatrix, his life estate in
the excess merged with his remainder interest and he took absolutely.
17. In a letter written on December 11, 1933 to Profesor A. G. Gulliver of Yale Law
School, Surrogate James A. Foley gave the following as the final accounting in Mattr of
Apple:
Gross estate less debts ................................. $24,796.95
Less:
Funeral and administration expenses ................ $3000.00
Outright elect share of husband .................. 2500.00 5,500.00
Net distributable estate $19,296.96
Amount required to be retained in fund for
Remainder charitable interests ................... $12,398.48
Non-charitable remaindermen .................... 4,0D.0 $16,393AS
Husband's interest in property passing presently
by reason of merger of his legal life estate and
intestate interest therein ........................................ $2,93A
At the time of the decision the amounts of the funeral and administration expenses were
not available to the court.
18. 151 Misc. 459, 271 N. Y. Supp. 913 (Surr. Ct. 1934). The net estate of $12,215.59
was left to A and B and their survivor for life with remainder to charity. The court com-
puted the present values of life estates as $4,600.26, which deducted from the net estate
gives a difference of $7,615.33, the present value of the charity's remainder. While the
report is not clear, apparently one-half the net estate, $6,107.79, a future value, was then
deducted from the present value of $7,615.33, leaving a difference of $1,50754 to pas as
intestate property. This method leaves about $2000 undisposed of at the husband's death.
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also, in the final accounting, future values alone were used, so if any error had ,been
made it was rectified.19
If the language of the amended statute and that of the Commission are to be ac-
cepted at their face values, the interpretation that the amendment should be given
effect in the first instance to decide whether the statute has been violated seems more
reasonable. This interpretation gives full effect to the language of the amendment that
"1no allowance . . . for . . . postponement" shall'be made, and avoids the arbitrary
result reached under the courts' interpretation wherein pure chance will be the decisive
element in many cases in deciding whether or not Section 17 has been violated, and wheth-
er or not as a consequence charity will receive a large or a small remainder.20 Moreover,
this'interpretation is very simple in its application, for whenever the principal fund
of the estate in which the life tenant and remaindermam have their interests exceeds
one-half the present value of the net estate, all that needs to be done is to reduce
the remainder charity will receive in the future to that prescribed one-half. Finally,
this interpretation, by using future values, makes possible a much simplee means of
ascertaining the amount to pass by intestacy when the statute has been violated.
If in adding the amendment to Section 17, the Commission to Investigate Defects
in the Laws of Estates and the legislature intended that thereafter charity should re-
ceive less kthan one-half the estate valued at the time of the life tenant's death, it
would seem most reasonable to apply this same policy consistently to every case. But
if the Commission and the legislature had no intention of reducing the charity's share
to less than one-half the estate as thus valued, yet since the effect of the amendment
is to do exactly this, it might be desirable to repeal the amendment and return to the
procedure used prior to 1929. Either solution would seem to afford more uniform and
reasonable results than those reached under the courts' interpretation of the amended
statute.
PRIVILEGE IN TESTAMENTARY LIBEL
OcCASIONALLY an ingenious person will hit upon what seems to him a flawless
method of vituperation-the insertion of defamatory matter in his will. The fact
that such an instrument is one to which most men give careful deliberation tends to
imply a malicious and premeditated attempt to injure. The harm thus accomplished
is possibly more acute because, in view of the significance of a will, the objectionable
statement receives a wide initial circulation and, still more important, because its
perpetuation is accomplished by incorporation in the constantly-used land records
wherever the testator has left realty. Moreover, the vilified person may be inclined,
19. Final accounting in Matter of Miranda by Surrogate's Court for County of Kings,
June 2, 1934. In this accounting there were administration expenses of $2,105.53 and an
exemption to the husband of $409, which deducted from the ne estate of $12,219.59 gave
a difference of $9,701.06. Deducting from this the amount of $6,107.79 which was required
to be retained in the fund for payment of the charity's remainder, there was left $3,593.27
which was to pass as intestate property on the death of the life tenants.
20. Usually when a will is drawn the testator cannot know how much longer he Is going
to live. Where the charity is remainderman after a life tenant, the decisive factor in ar-
riving at the present value of the remainder is the expectancy of the life tenant. Hence, if
a testator lives a long time after making such a will, there is a probability that he thereby
shortens the expectancy of the life tenant, so that the remainder's present value is more
likely to exceed one-half the net estate. But if the testator should die suddenly after malting
the will, the tenant's expectancy is possibly longer, and if the life tenant's expectancy is
more than 14/8 years, there will be no violation of the statute, since any amount, at 5%
interest compounded annually, will double itself over that length of time.
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perhaps owing to the usual respect paid the dead, to show at least some measure of
restraint in answering the charges. Thus the case of the injured party provides a com-
pelling motive to afford some judicial remedy. The consideration that in some in-
stances the charges may not actually be false, but that the testator's death may have
extinguished the available evidence of the truth, is not sufficient reason to permit an
obviously designing person a safe method of heaping calumny upon his enemy. Two
types of relief suggest themselves. One is to refuse the will probate, either in whole
or in part; the other, to allow the injured person compensation for the harm done by
permitting a money recovery against the executor in either his personal or his repre-
sentative capacity.1
A sensible policy, dictating that no court should allow its records to be used as a
medium of causing injury by the circulation of defamatory matter, calls for its exclu-
sion from the probate record. A rejection of the entire will not only would check
most of the injury,2 but would undoubtedly have a salutary effect on all contemplating
such a method of vilification.3 Yet a more moderate policy of simply refusing probate
to the libelous portions would be as effective in preventing any substantial injury and
would also eliminate the danger of such loss to legatees or devisees as might occur
in banning the entire document.4 Unless the libeled person himself happens to Imow
beforehand of the matter, however, either theory is likely to prove ineffective for
want of an interested party to seek exclusion of the libelous portions of the vll at
the time of probate.
While such an interest in obtaining exclusion of libelous material could perhaps ba
created by imposing a personal liability for libel upon the executor or other person
presenting the will for probate, nevertheless this would mean imposing liability for an
injury which in substance had been done by another man. Indeed, there probably
could be no personal liability, for even though the publication alone would ordinarily
be a sufficient basis for an action of libel,0 the publication in this case is made in pur-
l. Still another form of relief, an injunction, which might prevent publication at le.st in
the land records, seems unavailable. It has been consistently refused because of the dangers to
the freedom of the press that it would entail. McFarlan v. Manget, 179 Ga. 17, 174 S. E.
712 (1934); Finnish Temperance Society v. Raivaaja Publishing Co., 219 Mass. 28, 105 N. E.
561 (1914); BrandretHl v. Lance, 8 Paige 24 (N. Y. Ch. 1839); Re Mdaxwell, 140 L. T. R.
(N. s.) 471 (P. 1929).
2. It is assumed that the court excluding the matter from probate would prohibit any
publicizing of the proceedings.
3. But without statutory authorization, courts could hardly be expected to exclude the
entire will on such grounds.
4. It seems clear that parts of a will may be rejected, and where libelous matter has not
been dispository, exclusion has been allowed. Matter of T- B -, 27 Abb. N. C. 425,
18 N. Y. Supp. 214 (Surr. Ct. 1S92); In re Wartnaby, 1 Bob. Eccl. 423 (Prer. 1846); In
Estate of White, (1914] P. 153; In Estate of Cafe, 43 Times L. R. 697 (P. 1927); Re Max-
well, 140 L. T. R. (x. s.) 471 (P. 1929); In Goods of Bowker, [1932] P. 93; see 2 ScHou-
R Wins (6th ed. 1923) § 819. But the general power has sometimes been doubted in re-
fusing the specific request. Matter of Aleyer, 72 Misc. 566, 131 X. Y. Supp. 27 (Surr. Ct.
1911); Curtis v. Curtis, 3 Add. Eccl. 33 (Prer. 1325); In Goods of Honywood, L. R. 2
Prob. & Div. 251 (1871).
5. All connected with the publication of libel are responsible as joint tortfeasors. Grinnell
v. Cable-Nelson Co., 169 Mich. 183, 135 N. W. 92 (1912); Wahlbheimer v. Hardenbergh, 169
App. Div. 190, 145 N. Y. Supp. 161 (1st Dep't, 1914) ; McCurdy v. Hughes, 63 N. D. 435,
248 N. W. 512 (1933). Even in the event of the exclusion of the matter from the record the
mere presentation of the will before the probate judge would constitute a technical publica-
tion, but since this would result in no substantial injury, it would seem unwise to hold liab!e
either the executor personally or the estate for possible punitive damages.
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suance of a duty to produce the will for probate.0 Tort liability ordinarily will not
be exacted for injuries resulting from obedience to a duty.7
There remains the possibility of an action against the executor in his representative
capacity. The fact that the testator left thd defamatory matter in such a form that
its publication would be inevitable is a forceful reason for considering this a just claim
against his estate.8 Though it seems hard to deprive the testator's relatives and
friends of a portion of their expectancies by allowing damages which are in their
nature more punitive than compensatory, this policy not only would have a deterring
effect upon a testator because he could be sure that his libeled enemy would be given
an opportunity to recover from the estate, but would also be a strong incentive to
executors, devisees, and legatees to seek exclusion of the libel from the probate record.
But doctrinal difficulties abound. Although all the hornbook ingredients of a cause
of action are present, one essential element, publication, occurs only after the testator's
death.9 While no question of survival of the action is present, there being at the time
of death no cause of action to abate or survive,' 0 nevertheless it might be argued
that, since survival statutes ordinarily except libel and slander, this action'for a libel-
ous publication after death, being substantially the same as that in which publication
occurs before death in that it would likewise result in allowing a recovery to the
libeled party at the expense of legatees and devisees, should be barred on the basis of
the same policy which motivated the legislatures to refuse a remedy in that case.,11
Yet the desirability of relief in this situation, combined with the general tendency to
restrict the policy against recovery in tort from decedents' estates,1 2 should serve to
counteract this argument. Bu still another apparent bar is the rule that an estate is
not liable for a, tort occurring after the decedent's death.13 This rule apparently ap-
plies even to torts involving the decedent's, rather than the executor's or administra-
tor's wrongful conduct, where, if living when the injury happened, the former would
have been liable.14 An attempted circumvention of this rule by considering the execu-
6. See, e.g., PA. STAT. AmN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 1883; N. Y. SuRn. Aci. (1928)
§ 137; Matter of Young, 216 App. Div. 595, 216 N. Y. Supp. 112 (3d Dep't, 1926); see In re
Avery, 117 Conn. 201, 203, 167 Atl. 544, 545 (1933); 2 Womu , Amrnu AsmToN (3d ed.
1923) § 214.
7. Hitchcock v. Bacon, 118 Pa. 272, 12 Ad. 352 (1888); Fisher v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.
Co., 102 Va. 363, 46 S. E. 381 (1904).
8. See HARPER, LAW or TORTS (1933) § 236.
9. ODGERs, LiBEL AND SLA DER (6th ed. 1929) 131; HOLe, LAW or LniaE (Am, ed. 1818)
254. Though publication might have taken place prior to the testator's death, it Is the
posthumous publication which causes the substantial injury, and the fact that there had been
a previous publication would not defeat a cause of action satisfying the other requisites.
10. Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. R. 733 (Orphan's Ct. 1901) ; Harris v. Nashville Trust
Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584 (1913). Contra: Citizens' and Southern National Bank v.
Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S. E. 313 (1933), rev'g 43 Ga. App. 408, 158 S. E. 915 (1931);
cf. Shupe v. Martin, 12 S. W. (2d) 450 (Mo. 1928).
11. See Evans, Statutory Survival of Tort Claims (1931) 29 MIcH L. Rav. 969,
12. This tendency is illustrated by the expressed disfavor of the doctrine of abatement.
CfL Merrill v. Beckwith, 61 F. (2d) 912 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932); Miller v. Nuckollg, 76 Ark.
485, 89 S. W. 88 (1905) ; Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584 (1913).
But cf. Spence v. Carter, 33 Ga. App. 279, 125 S. E. 883 (1924).
. 13. The theory is that any tort committed by an executor is without the scope of h
representative authority so that only personal liability is possible. See 3 ScHouERn, WLLS
§ 2601.
14. Callaway v. Livingston, 28 Ga. App. 453, 111 S. E. 742 (1922); U. S. Casualty Co.
v. Rice, 18 S. W. (2d) 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); cf. Shupe v. Martin, 12 S. W, (2d) 450
(Mo. 1928). But see Helling v. Boss, 121 N. Y. Supp. 1013, 1016 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
Yet an action is allowed for a breach of contract which occurs after death, 1 Sciloulan,
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tor the testator's agent in the commission of the tort has been much criticized 5 be-
cause it conflicts with the usual agency law that the death of the principal terminates
the authority of the agent.16 Thus if the recovery is to be allowed, it is dear that an
exception must be made, as orthodox doctrinal grounds seem quite inadequate. Yet
three courts, though frankly recognizing these, difficulties, have been willing to allow
recovery because of the strong social and emotional appeal of the cause of action.17
But if it is to become established that recovery may be available in spite of these
technical obstacles, some limitations must be imposed by way of defense so that pro-
tection may be afforded the testator who includes a libelous statement in his will, not
with malice, but for the purpose of insuring the distribution of his property in accord-
ance with his desires. This problem received judicial consideration for the first time
in Nagle v. Nagle.'s There the objectionable statement, substantially charging illegit-
imacy, 19 was to the effect that the testator had only two children (naming them),
that the claim of any othee person to that relationship would be fraudulent, and that
the executors should resist to the last any contest of the will or demand to share in the
estate made by such a claimant.20 It was felt that the testator, in view of a long
Wmr.s § 715; 1 Wzr.mas s, Ex os AND ADmnIsr ons (12th ed. 1930) S0; 1 Wo=nm,
ADasRArrox § 37. Exceptions have been made in certain tort actions, one being where
the estate has received some pecuniary benefit from the tort. 3 Scaourm, Wn.zs § 2742;
2 Wrmrzss, Exrwcuroas AND AnsnmmrPATos 1132, 1133; 2 Womam, A mns2nA-" o-
§ 293. Another exception was the old English doctrine of dilapidations. This action arao-
in the Courts Christian and was early adopted by the courts of law. Jones v. Hill, 3 Lev.
268 (K. B. 1687). It was in form an action on the case in tort and could be brought against
the executors of a parson by his successor in office. It did not become actionable until after
the testator's death. Sollers v. Lawrence, Willes 413 (K. B. 1743); Wise v. Metcalfe, 10 B.
& C. 299 (K. B. 1829) ; Bunbury v. Hewson, 3 Ex. 558 (1849) ; Mason v. Lambert, 12 Q. B.
795 (1848); see Bird v. Relph, 4 B. & Adol. 826, 830 (K. B. 1833); Wheatley v. Lane, 1
Saunder's R. 216a (K. B. 1681) (note on Sollers v. Lawrence, supra). This liability was
abolished by EccLEsmrsca. DILmApiDATIONS AcT, 34 & 35 Vicr. c. 43 (1871), which has been
replaced with substantial amendments, by the Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Measure, 14 & IS
Geo. V., No. 3 (1923), as amended by the Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Amendment Measure,
19 & 20 Geo. V., No. 3 (1929).
15. Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584 (1913), noted in (1914)
27 HARv. L. Rxv. 666; (1914) 62 U. or PA. L. Rnv. 643; (1914) 23 Yrux L. J. 534. See
also (1902) 15 HARv. L.R nv. 483; (1931) 16 Mnm. L. Rzv. 93.
16. RESTATFmNT, AGmzcy (1933) § 120. Yet if a negative implication can be drawn
from the reason given for the rule refusing to hold the estate liable for torts (see note 13,
supra), the result would be to impose liability here. Although the action would be barred by
strict agency concepts, the act would seem to be clearly within the 'scope of the executors
authority"--a criterion at least borrowed from the law of agency.
17. Citizens' and Southern National Bank v. Hendricks, 43 Ga. App. 403, 158 S. E. 91S
(1931), rev'd, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S. E. 313 (1933); Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. R. 733
(Orphan's Ct. 1901); Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584 (1913).
18. 175 Atl. 487 (Pa. 1934), noted in (1935) 48 HIav. L. Rzv. 1027. The plea of privlege
was briefly considered by the Court of Appeals in Citizens' and Southern Natioial Bank v.
Hendricks, 43 Ga. App. 408, 410, 158 S. E. 915, 916 (1931), rev'd, 176 Ga. 692, 163 S. E. 313
(1933).
19. Such a charge has been considered libelous per se. Shelby v. Sun Printing Ass'n, 33
Hun 474 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1886); Matter of T - B- , 27 Abb. N. C. 425, 18 N. Y.
Supp. 214 (Surr. Ct. 1892); Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584
(1913); see TowNsEN,, SANDmE Aan LEL (4th ed. 1890) § 176.
20. The fact that the allegation here is merely an insinuation would not make it any les
libelous. Cf. Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Denio 347 (N. Y. 1845); Riley v. Askin & Marine Co,
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course of litigation in which he had persistently denied that plaintiff was his child,
was justified in supposing that the simple method of disinheriting the plaintiff by say-
ing that she should take nothing would be inadequate to protect the estate against her
anticipated demands. The libelous' statement therefore was held to be privileged on
two possible grounds, either that the filing of a will, as the beginning of a judicial
proceeding, was analogous to a pleading in a civil action, or that it was made in good
faith in an effort to protect property rights.
If this decision is to be construed as affording to testamentary libel the relatively
complete protection of absolute privilege, by which a recovery could be had only if
the libel were irrelevant to a testamentary disposition,2 1 it seems open to objection,
particularly iA view of the tendency not to extend the application of absolute privi-
lege.22 Such a privilege could easily be invoked to defeat recovery in those cases in
which recovery is desirable, for a testator ingenious enough to select this novel method
of defamation might well be sufficiently skillful to forestall any recovery by simply
accompanying the libel with a nominal bequest, which might effectively bring it within
the requirement of relevancy.23 Furthermore, it is difficult to understand how there
is here involved that public interest in securing a better administration of justice by
removing from bench, bar, parties, and witnesses the fear of civil accountability for
statements made under pressure of a lawsuit which alone justifies the absolute privi-
lege accorded such statements. 24 Although the rule as ordinarily stated seems to cover
the instant case, the reason on which it is based is inapplicable.2 5
134 S. C. 198, 132 S. E. 584 (1926); Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W.
584 (1913).
21. Wilson v. Sullivan, 81 Ga. 238, 7 S. E. 274 (1888); Hoar v. Wood, 44 Mass. 193
(1841) ; People ex rel Bensky v. Warden, 258 N. Y. 55, 179 N. E. 257 (1932) ; Dunham v.
Powers, 42 Vt. 1 (1869); Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193 (1860); see CooLEY, CoNsrrt-
TiONAL LhnTATiONS (6th ed. 1890) 542; NErwzv , SLANDER AND LiBEL (4th ed. 1924) §§ 357,
359; SEELmAN, LiBFL AN SLANDER (1933) § 191. English. courts have given complete pro.
tection whether the matter be relevaint or not. Munster v. Lamb, 11 Q. B. Div. 588 (1883).
22. See Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 35, 81 Ati. 1013, 1019 (1911); Tanner v. Steven-
son, 138 Ky. 578, 585, 128 S. W. 878, 881 (1910); Andrews v. Gardlner, 168 App. Div. 629,
632, 154 N. Y. Supp. 486, 489 (1st Dep't, 1915), rev'd, 224 N. Y. 440, 121 N. E. 341 (1918) ;
Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 321, 135 N. E. 515, 516 (1922); Taber v. Aransas Harbor
Terminal Ry., 219 S. W. 860, 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); SELVAN, L EL. AND SLANDER § 269,
For a criticism of absolute privilege itself see White v. Nickolls, 3 How, 591, 601 (1845).
23. As in the famous case where a notorious libertine maliciously gave legacles in alleged
compensation to certain ladies who had repulsed his advances given as an example in Gal-
lagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. R. 733, 737 (Orphan's Ct. 1901). Yet it is most difficult, though
not impossible, to show that libelous matter which is absolutely privileged is irrelevant.
Cf. Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 14 Atl. 518 (1888); Moore v. Manufacturers' National
Bank, 123 N. Y. 420, 25 N. E. 1048 (1890) ; Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N. Y. 440, 121 N. B.
341 (1918).
24. See Wilson v. Sullivan, 81 Ga. 238, 244, 7 S. E. 274, 276 (1888); Krumin v. Bruknes,
255 I1. App. 503, 507 (1930) ; McLaughlin v. Cowley, 127 Mass. 316, 319 (1879) ; Bolton v.
Walker, 197 "Mich. 699, 707, 164 N. W. 420, 423 (1917) ; Grantham v. Wilkes, 135 ML, 777,
784, 100 So. 673 (1924) ; Marsh v. Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. 309, 312 (1872) ;1 Taber v. Aransas
Harbor Terminal Ry., 219 S. W. 860, 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Calklns v. Sumner, 13
Wis. 193, 196 (1860); Bottomley v. Broughan, [1908J 1 K. B. 584, 587.
25. Probate is, of course, a judicial'proceeding. Reycraft v. McDonald, 194 Mich. 900,
160 N. W. 836 (1916). Thus the rule of absolute privilege could be extended to include pro-
bate, particularly in view of the many cases where the concept of a judicial proceeding has
been stretched far to bring the libel within the protection of absolute privilege. McDavltt
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A qualified privilege which may in general be said to be founded on the desire to
safeguard private rather than public interests, would seem to afford all the protection
over, seems more in harmony with precedent, falling easily within the well-established
category of cases according such a privilege to statements made for the protection of
needed without blocking a ready recovery when the libel was designed simply to air
a grievance. The statement would then be privileged only when bona fide g and rea-
sonably necessary to protect the testator's recognized interests.2 7 Such a result, more-
property rights.23
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ASSESSarENT UPON RAILROAD FOR UNDERPASS ON L. TEPRSTATE,
FuEnAI.-Am HIGHWAY
THE highway commission of Tennessee, acting under statute,1 ordered the com-
plainant railroad to construct an underpass where a proposed federal-aid highway
was to cross its tracks in the rural community of Lexinton and to pay the fixed
statutory share of one-half the cost. The railroad, conceding that ordinarily a state
may assess it up to the whole cost of eliminating a grade crossing,- nevertheless
attacked the constitutionality of the order and statute, contending that the imposition
v. Boyer, 169 M11. 475, 48 N. E. 317 (1S97) (suing out warrant from magistrate); Shumway
v. Warrick, 103 Neb. 652, 189 N. W. 301 (1922) (hearing of state banking board); Rogers v.
Thompson, 89 X. J. L. 639, 99 Adl. 3S9 (1916) (meeting of creditors hefore bankruptcy
referee); Newfield v. Copperman, 47 How. Pr. 87 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1873) (affidavit sworn
before fire marshall); Connellee v. Blanton, 163 S. W. 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (applica-
tion to governor for pardon); Bottomley v. Broughan, [1903] 1 K. B. 584 (report of an
official receiver.)
26. Publications cease to be privileged when proved by the plaintiff's evidence to have
been actuated by malice or to have been made in bad faith. King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113
(N. Y. 1829) ; Mellen v. Athens Hotel Co., 153 App. Div. 891, 138 N. Y. Supp. 451 (1st Dep't,
1912); Tuohy v. Halsell, 35 Okla. 61, 128 Pac. 126 (1912). But cf. Stevens v. Snow, 191
Cal. 58, 214 Pac. 968 (1923) (placing burden of proof on defendant to show absence of
malice).
27. Hatch v. Lane, 105 Mass. 394 (1870); Smith v. Smith, 73 Mich. 445, 41 N. W. 499
(1889); Tierney v. Ruppert, 150 App. Div. S63, 135 N. Y. Supp. 36S (2d Dep't, 1912);
Suick v. Krom, 171 Wis. 254, 177 N. W. 20 (1920).
28. A communication is said to be qualifiedly privileged when made in good faith by a
person in matters where his interest is concerned or he has a private or public duty. Cadle
v. McIntosh, 51 Ind. App. 365, 99 N. E. 779 (1912); Hill v. Durham Co., 79 Hun 335, 29
N. Y. Supp. 427 (App. Div. 1st Dep't, 1894); Echard v. Morton, 26 Pa. Super. 579 (1924);
McDaniel v. King, 16 S. W. (2d) 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Stuart v. Bell, [1891] 2 Q. B.
341; NawLL, SIaNDmE Am LiBEL § 424.
1. Tt.-. CoDE ANN. (WVilliams, 1934) §§ 2638-2642 (one-half of cost of eliminating
grade crossings imposed on railroad). For similar statutes see Co:;-. GE:. Srx. (1930)
§ 3668 (railroad to pay at least one-half of expense); N. Y. Co:.sor. L-v.-s A,:.. (Mc-
Kinney, 1918) Book 48 §§ 91, 94, 95 (fifty-fifty division); N. J. CoioxP. SrT. (Supp.
1924) tit. 167 §§ 30, 31 (full cost imposed upon railroad).
2. The power of a state to compel a railroad to eliminate grade crossings or to share
in the expense of the separation of grades has been consistently upheld in Tennezsse, as
elsewhere. City of Harriman v. Southern Ry. Co., 111 Tenn. 538, 82 S. W. 213 (1924);
Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commisssion, 326 Il. 625, 153
N. E. 376 (1927). See also cases cited in note 15, infra.
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of the burden in this case was unreasonable in view of the special facts here involved,
namely, that the underpass was designed not to meet local safety needs,3 but rather
to advance the safety and convenience of interstate vehicular traffic in competition
with the railroad, that its construction was one of the conditions of the giving of
federal aid to the project,4 that the railroad, in its competition with trucks and
busses, was already seriously handicapped by the great disparity in the tax burdens
imposed upon the two modes of transportation in Tennessee, and that the highway
in question would tend to reduce even further its depleted revenues.0 The trial
court, although finding the underpass necessary for the safety of travelers and its
cost ($17,400) reasonable, upheld the railroad's contention and enjoined the highway
commissioner from attempting to enforce the order of payment. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee reinstated the order,7 declaring that changed trans-
portation conditions which render the operation of the statute burdensome have no
constitutional significance. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and re-
manded the case, holding that, since the assessment of the statutory percentage in this
case might be found arbitrary in view of the special facts adduced by the railroad, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee committed error in declining to consider them. 8
During the early history of the railroads and for a long time thereafter it was
reasonable to impose upon them the full cost of the separation of grades at cross.
3. Lexington has a population of only 1,823 inhabitants. The traffic on the old high-
way was and is small, and only 6 trains are operated each way in every 24 hours, 5 of
them moving between 10 p. m. and 6 a. m. when there is substantially no highway travel,
The modern electrical device at the grade crossing is adequate for the traffic there; and
the city authorities have never suggested the elimination of that grade crossing, which
remained unchanged after the new highway was put into use.
4. Both the federal aid legislation and the regulations adopted thereunder encourage
the elimination of grade crossings. See General Memorandum of the Bureau of Public
Roads, No. 13, July 5, 1922. "Railroad grade separations" are classed with "bridges" and
are thus excepted from the limitations placed upon the amount of federal aid which may
be expended upon each mile of roadway. 42 STAT. 660 (1922), 23 U. S. C. A. § 2 (1926),
The federal government may pay one-half of the total cost of an underpass, even If the
state is relieved by contributions of the railroad from paying the other half. Opinion of
Solicitor of Bureau of Public Roads, July 24, 1922.
5. The complainant railroad pays 28% of its gross revenues in taxes, state and local,
and cost of maintainance of its roadway, while commercial motor carriers pay only 7%
of theirs for those items and in addition are immune from making any contribution toward
the cost of this underpass.
6. The gross passenger revenue of the complainant railroad fell from $5,661,011 in 1920
to $1,139,238 in the first nine months of 1931, and its freight traffic experienced a similar
decline. That the decrease was due mainly to increased motor competition following the
construction of new highways appears from the fact that the decrease began while
general business was active, that even in the years of economic depression the fallwaysa
freight traffic was practically constant in the relatively few regions where its lines were
not paralleled by hard surfaced highways, and that traffic increased when highwaya
paralleling its lines were temporarily closed for reconstruction. See 45th Annual Report
of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1931) 95-107.
7. Nashville, Chattanooga, and St. Louis Ry. v. Baker, 167 Tenn. 470, 71 S. W. (2d)
678 (1934).
8. Nashville, Chattanooga, and St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 5s Sup. Ct. 486 (March 4,
1935). Mr. Justice Brandeis rendered the opinion, Justices Cardozo and Stone dissenting.
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ings in the elimination of the danger to vehicular traffic created by the trains; 0 for
the absence of effective competition by other methods of transportation made it
relatively easy for the railroads to shift the incidence of this burden. Also, high-
ways for a long time were feeders of rail traffic, and most of the underpasses were
located in municipalities whose growth indirectly benefited the railroads. Dynamic
changes, however, have occurred in the transportation scene. Airways, pipe lines,
waterways, power transmission lines, and highways have been carrying increasingly
more traffic in recent years.' 0 The revolution wrought by motor vehicle transporta-
tion has been especially detrimental to the railroad system. This competition has
been intensified by extensive federal grants-in-aid to the states for highway con-
struction, 1 particularly of late, when the incentive to relieve unemployment has
spurred the development of a national highway system.la Railroads are no longer
expanding, and it is the extension of highways which is now creating new grade
crossings. Furthermore, the responsibility for the danger at grade crossings may
no longer be placed exclusively on the railroads,13 and it is the desire to advance
the speed and convenience of motor traffic, as well as its safety, that now motivates
the separation of grades. Under such circumstances, to compel a railroad to help
the federal government provide an underpass for an interstate highway in effect
may be to order it to subsidize its competitors.
While the Court held that competition between motor vehicles and the railroads
had reached proportions significant enough to merit consideration in determining
whether a particular assessment on a railroad is constitutional,1 4 it found it difficult
9. Originally, when the railroad was a "new species of highway," [Shaw, C. ., in City
of Roxbury v. The Boston and Providence Rr. Corp., 6 Cush. 424, 429 (Mas5. lot0)], the
early attitude toward them was that "the business of railways is specially dangerous,"
[Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington Rr. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 150 (1855)], and that "croz-ing
highways and running locomotives, were they not authorized by law, would be nuisance".
[Mr. justice Strong, dissenting in Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S.
659, 679 (1878)]. Cf. English v. The New Haven and Northampton Co., 32 Conn. 240
(1864); Worcester, Nashua, and Rochester Rr. v. Nashua, 63 N. H. 593, 4 AtI. 293 (1,SSi);
Woodruff v. Catlin, 54 Conn. 277, 295, 6 At. 849 (1886).
10. See HiNsHAw, STOP, LooK, AND LTm=; RAmaO.%D TRAIJsPo.TATo: n; Tm U.:rrED
STATEs (1932); and also the 45th Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission
(1931) 95-107.
11. Since the beginning of the plan in 1916, when Congress appropriated , the
federal aid highway system has grown to significant proportions. During the decade of
the twenties the average annual expenditure by Congress for this purpose has been about
$80,000,000. 39 STAT. 355 (1916); 42 STAT. 212 (1921); 44 SrTA. 760 (1926).
12. Emergency highway construction necessitated by the depresion has led to sub-
stantial increases in the grants-in-aid to the states. $125,000,000 was appropriated for
each of the years 1931 and 1932, 46 STAT. 141 (1930), $400,0 D,00 was allotted for this
purpose in the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, 48 STT. 195, 203, 40
U. S. C. A. § 404 (a) (1934), and on June 18, 1934 a further appropriation of $
was made, 48 STrx. 993.
13. The speed of motor vehicles has increased sharply during recent years. See
note (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 838. Accidents caused by motor vehicles running into
trains increased steadily from 225 of the total of grade crossing accidents in 1928 to 31.3%'
of the total in 1933. Interstate Commerce Commission Accident Bulletins, Nos. 97-102,
Table 78.
.14. The arguments of the railroad concerning federal grants-in-aid, the disparity of
tax burden, and the necessity of the underpass as an incident of long range vehicular
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to reconcile the result arrived at with well settled principles. For in previous cases
in this field, which hold without dissent that a state may require a railroad to con-
tribute up to the full cost where an underpass is found necessary for the public safety
and where the cost of its construction is reasonable,'5 the factor of motor competi-
tion and the other arguments raised by the railroad in the instant case were ex-
pressly and consistently held to have no bearing on the constitutional issue.10 While
the holding of the Court is reached by excepting this case from prior decisions on
the basis of its special facts,1 ' its effect is to widen the scope of inquiry into the
reasonableness of grade crossing elimination orders by including all the factors
relevant to the determination of that broad issue.
While objection to the decision may be made on the ground that the rule thus
established will lead to increased and prolonged litigation of such matters by rail-
roads, nevertheless, it is likely that the results of the decision will in practice be not to
increase litigation, but merely to shift the emphasis of argument in the numerous ap.
peals which the railroads have been bringing even under the established status of the
law.' 8 The extension of judicial review under the Fourteenth Amendment implicit in
traffic are relevant only as they buttress the main contention that the assessment upon
the railroad is really a subsidy to its competitors, and unreasonable because of that fact.
15. New York and New England Rr. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556 (1894); Missouri
Pacific Ry. Co. v. City of Omaha, 235 U. S. 121 (1914); Erie Rr. Co. v. Board of Public
Utility Commissioners of New Jersey, 254 U. S. 394 (1921); Lehigh Valley Rr. Co. v.
Board of Public Utility Commissioners of New Jersey, 278 U. S. 24 (1928); State ex
rel. Alton Rr. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 334 Mo. 832, 68 S. W. (2d) 691 (1933).
16. Erie Rr. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners of New Jersey, 254 U. S.
394 (1921), Matter of Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry. Co., 220 App. Div.. 80 (N. Y.
1927), aff'd without opinion, 245 N. Y. 643 (1927), cert. denied, 276 U. S. 603 (1928) (dif-
ficulty encountered by railroad in meeting expense); Lehigh Valley Rr. Co. v. Board of
Public Utility Commissioners of New Jersey, 278 U. S. 24 (1928) (necessity for underpass
to increase the speed of motor vehicles and to advance public convenience as well as
safety); New Orleans and N. E. Rr. Co. v. State Highway Commission, 164 Miss, 343,
144 So. 558 (1932) (fact that construction of underpasses intensifies competition by motor
vehicles); Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 315
Mo. 1108, 287 S. W. 617 (1926) (entrance of federal government into the field of highway
building by grants-in-aid to the states); State ex rel. Missouri Pacific Rr. Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 297 S. W. 47 (Mo. 1927) (advancement of interstate highway traffic
by underpasses which are not required from considerations of local safety needs); State
ex rel. Alton Rr. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 334 Mo. 832, 68 S. W. (2d) 691 (1933)
(lack of benefit to the railroad from the separation of grades).
17. In departing sub rosa from established principles, the decision of necessity contains
elements of inconsistency. In attempting to gloss over this logical weakness, Mr. Justice
Brandeis exaggerates certain factors and minimizes the importance of others. This Is
especially true of his treatment of the safety element in which he says that a grade
separation is merely a desirable engineering feature comparable to the widening and
strengthening of the highway and the bridging of streams and that is the railroad
which requires protection from dangers incident to motor transportation.
18. There is the further probability that the decision may, in the long run, lead to a
decrease in this type of litigation. In this connection, the following statement is of it)-
terest: "As to elimination of crossings at grade of highway and railroads. . . .the rail-
roads' share of the cost should be materially reduced. In many states the railroads
share is as high as fifty per cent. This is unduly burdensome and unfair to the railroads,
and it has naturally resulted in bitter opposition to elimination orders and the general
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the decision might also be ground for objection, for the Supreme Court has been
criticized in the past for interfering with the attempts of the state legislatures to meet
social and economic problems raised by changing conditions and for failing to consider
closely all relevant facts.19 Judicial review on grounds of reasonableness, however,
is an accomplished and continuing fact,2 o and furthermore, this decision differs from
those which have been so criticized in that it requires state courts and legislatures
to look at the facts and to take an occasional inventory of their statutes to see that
their provisions have not become obsolete and unreasonable by virtue of changes
in the situations to which they apply.2' Finally, in rebuking the Tennessee Supreme
Court for failing to consider all the facts,22 the decision may point toward a more
equitable solution of the problem of apportionment of the burden of eliminating
grade crossings.P
PRODUCIG LqTESTACY BY PARL EVMENCE OF THE REVOCATION CLAusm
IN A LOST WILL
AFTER decedent's death in 1933, a will executed in 1921 was found with his
papers. The heirs objected to its admission to probate, alleging that a second will
expressly revoking the first had been executed in 1929, and that decedent had taken
slowing up of the crosing elimination program." Report of the National Tranportation
Committee, New York (1933) p. 39.
19. Bounnr, GOVEsua=T BY JUDIcIARY (1932); CORY,=s, TnE Twiraor or = Su-
PR=_a CouRT, pp. 52-101 (1934); Pound, Liberty of Contract (1909) 18 YA= L. J. 454.
20. For examples of invalidation of state statutes and orders under the Fourteenth
Amendment during the current term of the Court see: Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis,
55 Sup. Ct. 525 (1935); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Commcsson
of Kansas, 55 Sup. Ct. 563 (1935). Cf. Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S.
194 (1934).
21. The statutes of several states already provide for discretionary apportionment of
the cost, thereby permitting flexibility of operation sufficient to meet the constitutional
test laid down in this case. See: ILL. REV. STAT. Axs. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 111 2/3, §
62; Mass. Acts 1934, c. 357, § 1; N. D. Comm. LAws AnN. (Supp. 1925) § 46SSI a-li.
22. Constitutionality under the due process clause is primarily a question of fact. Neb-
bia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934); Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.
S. 194 (1934); Comment (1930) 30 CoL. L. Rv. 360. And a decision upon the consti-
tutional question does not preclude later inquiry into reasonableness. Able State Bank
v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765 (1931); Missouri Pacific Rr. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U. S. 249 (1931);
Hubbell Bank v. Bryan, 124 Neb. 51, 245 N. W. 20 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U. S. 753
(1933); Note (1931) 29 Mac. L. Rav. 1073; Note (1931) 40 YArx L. J. 1101.
23. Railroads are no longer considered fair game for legislative impositions. Their
importance to the economic well being of the country and the need of a fair and carefully
worked out governmental policy toward them are becoming widely recognized. See Tmws-
PORTATiON ACT, 41 STAT. 456 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 71 (1926); E=rmLcOY RAILOAD
TRANSPORTATION ACT, 48 STAT. 211 (1933), 49 U. S. C. A. § 250 (1934) ; Simp-on, Tbe Inter-
state Commerce Cornmission and Railroad Consolidation (1929) 43 HARnv. L. Rnv. 192;
Hearings before a Sub-committee of the Committee on Banking and Currency on S. J. Res.
245, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) (Loans to Railroads by R. F. C.); HInsmHw, SToP, Lcol,
mm Ls=; RALROAD TRANSPORTAIO.i nr THE Uzzrrm STATES (1932); N. Y. Times,
April 13, 1935 at 1, col. 3 (indication that $200,000,000 will be spent by the federal
government for elimination of grade crossings without requiring railroads to contribute);
Report of the National Transportation Committee, New York (1933).
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possession of this will, but that though search had been made, it bad not been
found. No attempt was made to establish the missing second will in place of the
first, the object being merely to prove the execution of the revoking clause in the
second will by the parol testimony of two witnesses, and thus, by defeating
the probate of the prior will, to establish an intestacy. The first will was admitted
to probate despite the heirs' objections, and on appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed the decision on the ground that parol testimony of an unproduced
written revocation constituted parol revocation1 and was inadmissible."
An analysis of this decision requires a survey of the Pennsylvania law as to how
a revocation may be effected, and how it may be proved, with particular regard to
the situation where the revoking instrument, having been in the testator's posses-
sion, can not be found. It is provided by statute3 that the revocation of a will
may be achieved by destruction of the instrument by the testator, or by a subsequent
will,4 a codicil, or some other writing, duly executed and proved by at least two
witnesses.0 It is well established that a missing wil may be proved by parol evi-
dence for the purposes of probate, 6 and until fairly recently the Pennsylvania courts
have assumed that a missing will can be proved in the same manner when the solo
purpose is to revoke a prior will and thus establish an intestacy.7  A similar ruling
has resulted in other jurisdictions where the question has arisen.8  In order to
establish the revocation and resulting intestacy by parol testimony, the heirs would
1. A will can not be revoked by parol. Fox v. Fox, 88 Pa. 19 (1878); Harrison's Appeal,
100 Pa. 458 (1882). But until recently this rule was limited to oral declarations of revo-
cation by the testator. See Seiter's Estate, 265 Pa. 202, 206, 108 AtM, 614, 615 (1919);
In re Ford's Estate, 301 Pa. 183, 195, 151 AtI. 789, 793 (1930).
2. In re Koehler's Estate, 175 At. 424 (Pa. 1V34). (Linn, J. dissenting), This
should probably not be interpreted as meaning that a lost revoking will could not be
proved by parol for purposes of probate. The more likely interpretation is that a missing
will can not be proved by parol merely to establish a revocation and a resulting intetacy.
This is implied by the court's emphasis on the fact that the contestants here were not
attempting to probate the second will. For other indications, see Harrison's Estate, 316
Pa. 15, 173 AtI. 407, 409, 410 (1934); but cf. In re Wear's Will, 116 N. Y. Supp. 304,
131 App. Div. 875 (N. Y. 1909).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20 §§ 271, 272.
4. A subsequent will may revoke a prior one by an express revocation clause. Price
v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23 (1857). Or by inconsistency. Hoffner's Estate, 161 Pa. 331, 29
AtI. 33 (1894); McClure's Estate, 309 Pa. 370, 165 AtI. 24 (1933).
S. PA. STAT. ANqw. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 191.
6. Glockner v. Glockner, 263 Pa. 393, 106 AtI. 731 (1919); Hodgson's Estate, 270 Pa,
210, 112 Atl. 778 (1921); Lawman's Estate, 272 Pa. 237, 116 Atl. 538 (1922).
7. Lawson v. Morrison, 2 Dall. 286 (Pa. 1792); Boudinot v. Bradford, 2 Y. 170 (Pa.
1797); Jones v. Murphy, 8 W. &. S. 275 (Pa. 1844); Youndt v. Youndt, 3 Grant 140
(Pa. 1861); Stephenson's Estate, 6 Pa. Co. Ct. 628 (1888); McKenna v. McMichael, 189
Pa. 440, 42 Atl. 14 (1899); Pare's Estate, 15 Dist. 553 (Pa. 1906); Kerchner's Estate, 41
Pa. Super. Ct. 112 (1909); Mvanning's Estate, 46 Pa. Super. Ct. 607 (1911); WVulff's Es.
tate, 26 Dist. 144 (Pa. 1916).
8. TnTANY, REAL PROPERT~r (1912 ed.) ch. 20, p. 961, § 417; Cornish, Dependent Rla-
tiv Revocation (1932) 5 So. CAL. L. Rav. 273, 278; Evans, Testamentary Revoation by
Subsequent Instrument (1934) 22 Kr. L. J. 469, 499; see the dissent of Linn, 3. In lIar-
rison's Estate, 316 Pa. 15, 173 AtI. 407, 410 (1934), (1935) 29 Inr,. L. Ry.v 1092.
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have to produce at least two witnesses to the execution0 and revocatory contents10
of the missing revoking will, although proof of its contents other than the revoking
clause would probably be unnecessary." Where the missing instrument had beea
in the testator's custody, the heirs would also be faced with a presumption that the
revoking will had been destroyed by the testator animo revocandi, and hence was
itself revoked.' 2  If this presumption could be overcome, the revocation of the
prior will would be clearly established, even though the revoking will were not pro-
bated, and an intestacy would result.13 If the presumption were not overcome,
however, and the revoking will were itself considered revoked, the question would
immediately arise as to whether the prior will was in force or not. In this situation
there have developed in the different jurisdictions at least five methods of deter-
mining whether the prior will becomes effective or the testator dies intestate, these
variations depending fundamentally on one of two possible rationales. 14  On the
one hand it has been said that a will is not operative until the death of the
testator, so that a clause in a second will revoking a prior will can have no effect
until it becomes the testator's last will upon his death. Therefore the destruction
of the second will before the testator's death renders inoperative a clause contained
in it which expressly revokes the prior will, and leaves the prior will surviving as
though the second had never been executed. On the other hand, a revocation
clause in a subsequent will has been said to effect an immediate revocation of the
prior will. It follows from this rule that the later revocation of the second will
can not affect the status of the prior will, which may then be made operative only
by a re-execution.
Until recently the majority of the Pennsylvania cases adopted the former rationale
with the modification that there was a presumption that the prior will survived,
9. McKenna v. McMlchael, 1S9 Pa. 440, 42 At. 14 (1899); In re Harrison's F-tate,
316 Pa. 15, 173 Atl. 407 (1934) (an "other writing" as a revocation under the statute must
be proved in the same manner as a will).
10. Wuhff's Estate, 26 Dist. 144 (Pa. 1916); see Evans' Appeal, 58 Pa. 238, 243 (l 63};
In re Harrison's Estate, 316 Pa. 15, 173 Ad. 407, 409 (1934). Where the subzequznt
will is fraudulently destroyed by some person other than the testator, its revocatory con-
tents are presumed, and need not be proved. Jones v. Murphy, 8 W. & S. 275 (Pa. 18-14;
Pare's Estate, 15 Dist. 553 (Pa. 1906).
11. An express revocation clause in a subsequent will may be considered as an "other
writing" under the statute and the will need not be probatable in order to act as a revoca-
tion. In re Ford's Estate, 301 Pa. 183, 151 AUt. 789 (1930). Where a subsequent wil
has been fraudently destroyed and its contents are unknown, only its revocatory nature
is presumed, yet that is sufficient to allow its operation as a revocation. Jones v. Murphy,
8 W. & S. 275 (Pa. 1844); Pare's Estate, 15 Dist. 553 (Pa. 1906). In other jurisdictions
it is sufficient to prove merely the revoking clause. Wallis v. Wallis, 114 Mass. 510 (1374);
Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 94 N. W. 705 (1903); In re Wear's Will, 116 N. Y. Supp.
304, 131 App. Div. 875 (N. Y. 1909); see Evans, Testamentary Revocalion By Subscquimt
Instrunent (1934) 22 Ky. L. J. 469, 498-9.
12. Bate's Estate, 286 Pa. 583, 134 At. 513 (1926).
13. Cf. Jones v. Murphy, S W. & S. 275 (Pa. 1844); Pares Estate, 15 DIt. 553 (Pa.
1906). A will may be an effective revocation even though the dispositive clauses do not
become effective. McClure's Estate, 309 Pa. 370, 165 AU. 24 (1933). An intestacy in
such a situation may work a radical change in the testator's intent, but if the contents
of the missing will are known and the heirs simply do not offer it for probate, there is
always the possibility that the legatees can do so.
14. Note (1924) 28 A. L. R. 911.
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which could be overcome by evidence of the testator's intent to the contrary.10 The
effect of this modification was to allow heirs to establish intestacy, but only by over-
coming this presumption. In 1930, however, the supreme court held that an ex-
press revocation clause could be considered as an "other writing" under the statute,
and, having no testamentary character as such, that it operated to revoke the prior
will immediately upon execution. 16  In allowing the creation of an intestacy in
this case, the court also relied heavily on the fact that parol proof of the testator's
oral declarations clearly indicated that he intended to die intestate, implying that a
first will, after having been conclusively revoked by a subsequent written revocation,
may be revived by introducing evidence of a testator's oral declarations to prove
that he so intended. The effect of this decision was to discard the presumption of
the survival of the prior will,17 which obtained under the previous Pennsylvania
rule, and to substitute a presumption that the prior will does not revive, which may
be overcome by evidence of a written or oral republication.18  Consequently, it
seems clear that, once the heirs established the subsequent revocatory writing by
the testimony of two witnesses, they would successfully defeat the probate of the prior
will, unless its supporters could produce sufficient evidence of the testator's oral
declarations to establish the fact that the prior will was revived by republication.
Furthermore the admissibility of such evidence was doubtful.10
It therefore became apparent after that decision that if the heirs wished to defeat
a prior will and establish an intestacy, and if they were allowed to prove a missing
revoking instrument, they had open to them a relatively easy path to the alteration of
the testator's intent by producing fraudulent testimony. For once having established
the excution and revocatory nature of such an instrument by two witnesses, they need
go no further in order to make out a prima facie case, since even if the missing instru-
ment was considered revoked, they no longer had to meet a presumption of the sur-
vival of the prior will.20 The court, in holding in the principal case that parol evidence
of an unproduced written revocation was inadmissible, was undoubtedly motivated
by the fear of the possibilities of fraud inherent in this situation.21  While the
15. Lawson v. Morrison, 2 Dall. 286 (Pa. 1792); Flintham v. Bradford, 10 Pa. 82 (1848) ;
see Rudy v. Ulrick, 69 Pa. 177, 183 (1871); In re Ford's Estate, 13 D. & C. 777, 779 (Pa.
1930), rev'd, 301 Pa. 183, 151 Atl. 789 (1930). The modification really conflicts with the
rule against parol revocation, since the evidence used to overcome the presumption of
survival is usually comprised of the oral declarations of the testator, and following the
rationale strictly, these declarations would be the real revocation. See In re Ford's Estate,
supra, at 784.
16. In re Ford's Estate, 301 Pa. 183, 151 Atl. 789 (1930).
17. See In re Ford's Estate, 301 Pa. 183, 196, 151 Aft. 789, 794 (1930). This result will
probably be limited to situations where there is an express revocation clause.
18. Kerchner's Estate, 41 Pa. Super. Ct. 112 (1909); see Manning's Estate, 46 Pa.
Super. Ct. 607, 610 (1911).
19. Holmes' Estate, 240 Pa. 537, 87 Atl. 778 (1913). In principle, there seems little
distinction between parol revocation and parol republication. See In re Ford's Estate,
13 D. & C. 777, 784 (Pa. 1930), rev'd, 301 Pa. 183, 151 AtI. 789 (1930).
20. Nor need they prove the contents of the missing will, other than the revoking
clause, as is required of a person offering a lost will for probate. Cf. Hodgson's Estate, 270
Pa. 210, 112 Atl. 778 (1921); Lawman's Estate, 272 Pa. 237, 116 AtI. 538 (1922).
21. In Harrison's Estate, 316 Pa. 15, 173 Atl. 407, 409 (1934), the court said- "If
production of the revoking writing is not necessary before revocation can be accomplished,
all that would be required to overthrow an otherwise valid will would be to have two
evil disposed persons testify that they had seen a writing signed by the deceased, it matters
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possibilities are somewhat greater here than, for example, in an attempt to probate
a missing will, this consideration does not seem weighty enough to justify the court's
arbitrary solution of the problem, which shuts out all opportunity to get at the
testator's intent, and overrules a practice which has been accepted in Pennsylvan 7
as well as in other jurisdictions.8  For the class of people who could benefit by
this opportunity is limited to dissatisfied heirs. And the possibility of fraudulent
claims in this situation is limited not only by the fact that the heirs must satisfy
the minimum requirements of proof of revocation of the prior will and convince
a jury of the merit of their claim, but also by the fact that the proponents of the
prior will would have an opportunity to introduce proof that no subsequent instru-
ment was ever executed. If unable to do so, they might, by taking advantage
of the presumption that, since the second will was missing at the testators death,
it had been revoked by his intentional destruction of it, prove a revival of the
prior will by a written or perhaps parol republication. These potential barriers to
the claim of the heirs, together with the inevitable difficulties involved in downright
perjury, would surely provide a reasonable safeguard against the necessarily limited
number of fictitious claims which might arise. Therefore, it would seem that the
court might well allow heirs to introduce parol evidence of a missing revoking
instrument.
TAXni.ry As INcom or ComaRo=is PAINTS RESULTING FnO.A
WILL CONTFSTS
TnE elusive character of the concept of taxable income1 makes it difficult for the
taxpayer to determine whether or not an unusual receipt is taxable.2 If a receipt
can definitely be categorized as a "gain derived from capital, from labor, or from
both combined," thus falling within the definition of income as stated by the Supreme
Court,3 it is clearly taxable. Conversely, a receipt will be exempt if it is acquired
through a mere voluntary transfer of wealth already existing,4 as "by gift, bequest,
not how informal, of later date than the will, in which he declared be revoked it. Such
testimony would be much easier to procure than evidence of the complete contents of a
last will and would be most difficult to discredit. The possibility of such testimony would
cause all wills to be insecure from the machinations of the designing and corrupt."
1. For general discussion of the subject see 1 PAuL A.z MzminR=s, L. w or FEmmn
INcoars TAXATION (1934) c. 5; Hzwvrr, Tnx Darninoi, or Ixco= tID ITs APpLICATIor
nx FmzAL TAXAT N (1925); Magill, When is Income Realized? (1933) 46 H,%nv. L. Rnv.
933; Note (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 1072.
2. See Rosenberger v. McCaughn, 20 F. (2d) 139, 140 (E. D. Pa. 1927), aff'd 25 F. (2d)
699 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928), cert. denied 278 U. S. 604 (1928); 1 PAuL mm Mxarzxs, op. cit.
.mpra note 1, § 501.
3. Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 415 (1913); Doyle v. Mitchell
Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179, 185 (1918); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207 (1920).
More recent decisions, however, indicate that this definition has to some extent been modi-
fled. See Note (1932) 45 HMRv. L. REv. 1072.
4. "The rigid exclusion from the legal income definition of all gains not growing out
of the productive process is probably the result of an effort to tax the annual eamnrigs
of each citizen, and not pure windfalls .. . There are advantages in this r,triction. In-
heritances can be better handled under a separate tax law, and as for gifts, few are made
outside of the immediate family, except for charitable purposes.' HMawrr, op. cit. mpra
note 1, at 84. Cf. Rice, Barton and Fales v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 41 F. (2d)
339 (C. C. A. 1st, 1930); Autostrop Safety Razor Co., 28 B. T. A. 621 (1933).
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devise, or inheritance";5 and is thus in the nature of a windfall as contrasted with
earnings. The difficulty arises when a receipt does not definitely fall within either
of these categories and its status has not been previously determined by legislative
or judicial pronouncements. Such a problem was recently presented in a case decided
by the United States Board of Tax Appeals.6 The heirs at law of a testator insti-
tuted proceedings to set aside the will and have the property distributed under the
laws of descent and distribution. A compromise settlement was effected, and peti-
tioner, one of the heirs at law, received as his share $23,333.34. The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue added this sum to the "taxable income reported on petitioner's
return for the year. On appeal, the Board affirmed the Commissioner's ruling, hold-
ing that the amount was not an inheritance but that it constituted taxable income on
the ground that it was a gain resulting from the assertion and disposition of rights
which cost petitioner nothing.
The holding is consistent with the tendency of courts to give a strict construction
to the provision in the Revenue Act exempting gifts and inheritances from the
income tax.7 It is questionable, however, whether a payment to an heir at law in
compromise of a will contest is sufficiently distinguishable from an inheritance to
warrant its exclusion from the inheritance exemption.
An irreconcilable conflict exists in state courts as to whether such a compromise
payment constitutes an inheritance within the meaning of the State inheritance tax
statutes. The Board of Tax Appeals in the instant case apparently relies on the
majority view of the state courts which holds that the meaning of an inheritance
for the purposes of the state tax should be determined by a strict adherence to the
terms of the will, without reference to the estate's final disposition by the legatee;
and that, therefore, one who takes by contract with a legatee, rather than under the
will, is not receiving an inheritance within the meaning of the statute.8 This rule
results in taxing the legatee for the amount of the compromise payment, even
although another has ultimately received it. A respectable number of jurisdictions,
however, take the position that a compromise payment retains its identity as an in-
heritance, subject to tax, on the ground that the portion given up by the legatee is
S. Section 22(b)(3) of the Revenue Act excludes from gross income and thus exempts
from the income tax "the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance
(but the income from such property shall be included in gross income)." 48 STAT. 687
(1934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 2022 (b) (3) (1928). A number of other items are exempted
by the statute, U. S. Treas. Reg. 77 art. 51 et seq. (1932) ; and, in addition, certain receipts
are exempted on grounds of their fundamental character. Id. art. 81; see generally 1 PAUL
AD MERTENs, op. cit. supra note 1, c. 6.
6. Bernard 0. Kearney, 31 B. T. A. No. 174 (1934).
7. "The petitioner constructs her argument as ff the gift exemption were an omnibus
provision embodying any receipt which can not be fitted into the several categories set
forth in the statutory description of gross income. This is contrary to good reasoning.
Claiming such exemption, the petitioner must prove affirmatively that what she received
was a gift.' Mary G. Mulqueen 25 B. T. A. 441, 446 (1932), aff'd 65 F. (2d) 365 (C. C. A.
2d, 1933). See also Cora B. Blatty, 7 B. T. A. 726 (1927).
8. MacKenzie v. Wright, 31 Ariz. 272, 252 Pac. 521 (1927); In re Estate of Graves, 242
Ill. 212, 89 N. E. 978 (1909); In re Estate of Wells, 142 Iowa 255, 120 N. W. 713 (1909);
Baxter v. Treasurer, 209 Mass. 459, 95 N. E. 854 (1911); Matter of Cook, 187 N. Y. 253,
79 N. E. 991 (1907); cf. Shellabarger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 38 F. (2d)
566 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930); Hu S. McLung et al., 13 B. T. A. 335 (1928). This view rests
ultimately upon the theory that a will contest settlement is in effect a confirmation of
the legacy contested and not a renunciation of it.
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renounced and thus passes directly from the estate to the ultimate recipient as an
heir-at-law under the Statute of Distributions and Descent.0
Assuming that the majority state view is correct, and that there is a valid basis
for distinction between an inheritance and a compromise payment in construing state
inheritance tax statutes, it is doubtful whether this basis can -alidly be applied to
the determination of whether a compromise payment is income for purposes of the
Federal Revenue Act. The two problems involve different considerations. In the
former, the question to be determined is not whether a compromise payment is
taxable as inheritance but, whether as between two possible taxpayers, such payment
should be taxable to the legatee or to the ultimate recipient.10 It is probable in such
a situation that the majority view is based on the practical consideration that many
difficulties of tax administration can be eliminated by imposing the tax directly
on the legatee" and disregarding the fact that the assets making up the compromise
payment are actually never received by the legatee. In the latter problem, however,
the question for decision is whether the compromise payment should be taxed at all
as income. Since taxation is essentially a practical matter, receipts that are gen-
erally regarded as in the same classification should not be called income at one time
and inheritance at another, for tax purposes.12 It is doubtful whether a compromise
payment is sufficiently dissimilar to an inheritance to justify the creation of a new
income classification. The source of the compromise payment is an estate of inher-
itance and the rights of the recipient to contest the will are derived from the
inheritance laws. Furthermore, if in such cases the contestant had pursued the con-
test of the will uncompromisingly to a successful conclusion, there is presumably no
doubt that the greater amount, which would in that case be received by him, would
be entitled to an exemption from income tam It would seem inequitable to impose a
tax on the lesser amount, merely because the heir-at-law was villing to compromise
the suit instead of carrying it to a final judgment. The instant case will lead to
further inconsistent taxation in those jurisdictions which classify a compromise pay-
ment as an inheritance, since the same amount will presumably be taxed both by the
state government as inheritance and by the federal government as income.23
PROPERTY RIGnTS iN BusmEss; ScnmE =
Tnm defendant Liggett & Meyer Tobacco Co. received an unsolicited letter wherein
was described "an original advertising scheme", which the writer offered for -ale.
This scheme contemplated a campaign of billboard advertising with a picture of "two
gentlemen, well groomed, in working clothes or in hunting togs, apparently engaged
in conversation, one extending to the other a package of cigarettes, saying, 'Have one
of these,' the other replying, 'No thanks, I smoke Chesterfields."' The defendant
9. People v. Rice, 40 Colo. 50, 91 Pac. 33 (1907); Taylor v. State, 40 Ga. App. 29S 149
S. E. 321 (1929), noted in (1929) 29 COL. L. Rxv. 1164; In re Estate of Thor-on, 10
AiInn. 464, 185 N. W. 508 (1921).
10. See cases cited suPra, notes 8 and 9.
11. See K.nDR, SrAT hq=raAwcE TA.-rATIoz AND T,%muzirY or TnUsTs (1934)
28, 30.
12. It is said, for example, that courts will give weight to the opinion of the layman
in distinguishing between capital and income. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 1G9,
206-207 (1920); 1 PAUL AN'D mERTENs, op. cit. supra note 1, § 5.13.
13. State law as settled by decision does not necessarily govern the federal courts in
the interpretation of the income tax laws. See Rosenberger v. McCaughn, 25 F. (2d) 659
(C. C. A. 3d, 1928), cert. den. 278 U. S. 604 (1928); 5 PAuL ,.D M=r;s, op. cit. supra
note 1, § 53.38.
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replied that it could not use the scheme suggested. More than two years later,
defendant published widely a picture of two men and a caddy with golf-clubs, one
man having an open cigarette case, the other a package of Chesterfields, with the
slogan, "I'll stick to Chesterfields." Suing on the theory that defendant's publication
was an acceptance of an offer contained in the plaintiff's letter,1 the plaintiff recovered
$9000 as the reasonable value of the property rights in his advertising scheme.2 On
appeal to the Appellate Court of Indiana, the judgment was affirmed 3
To permit the originator of an idea to profit from it is in harmony with the general
policy of the law to allow each man to profit from his own effort. Since new ideas are
often of great value, especially in the competitive business world, it seems unjust to
allow others to use such ideas freely, and thus to get something valuable for nothing.
To clothe ideas with the safeguards thrown about property rights enables men to profit
from their ideas, and as a result encourages them to devise new ones, some of which
may benefit society. Although ideas of special benefit to humanity, such as those
which promote education and health, should become common property, society can
perhaps without detriment protect the majority of ideas. On the other hand, ideas
are so intangible and so difficult of isolation that they make an elusive subject-matter
for property rights. It is seldom possible to determine the exact nature of any idea,
or to compare accurately one idea with another. For example, it is difficult to decide
exactly what idea the plaintiff's letter contained, or to compare this idea with the
idea contained in defendant's publication. Moreover, it is often impossible to de-
termine the ultimate authorship of any idea. In the principal case, the plaintiff's
advertising idea may have been original, or it may have been suggested by a third
party or by another advertisement; and even if it was original, perhaps the defendant
conceived the same idea independently. Consequently, the administrative difficulty of
protecting any property rights in ideas is enormous. Evidence in court concerning the
alleged plagiarism of an abstract idea necessarily is inconclusive and unconvincing,
and it can seldom be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that one idea is exactly
similar to another or that it was not conceived independently.
Since any attempt to protect rights in such an intangible would result in hopeless
confusion, the courts have universally held that there are no property rights in bare
ideas. 4 However, when ideas are expressed in some concrete form, the administrative
difficulties are not so great, and consequently the form will generally be protected,
Thus, the plan of an architect,5 a business trademark,0 and the word-order of any
1. In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleged as a further acceptance of his offer the
distribution for advertising purposes of a picture of two women and a man, one woman
with an open cigarette box, the other with a package of Chesterfields, and the man taking
a Chesterfield out of the package; slogans at the top and bottom are, "I'd rather have a
Chesterfield," and "They satisfy."
2. A comparison of the letter with the advertisement will reveal that the defendant did
not use the express wording of the letter and thus disregard the common-law prohibition
on publication of letters. The recovery was rather for an abuse of property rights In the
advertising scheme, which may be described loosely as a scheme of using an imaginary
man's preference for Chesterfields for billboard advertising purposes.
3. Liggett & Meyer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 194 N. E. 206 (App. Ct. Ind. 1935).
4. Downes v. Culbertson, 153 Misc. 14, 275 N. Y. Supp. 233 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (Mr.
Culbertson's ideas of bidding and of card-evaluation in contract bridge); see Mackay v.
Franklin Realty, 288 Pa: 207, 210, 135 Atl. 613, 614 (1927) (ideas contained in preliminary
plans of an architect).
5. Larkin v. Pennsylvania Rr. Co., 125 Misc. 238, 210 N. Y. Supp. 374 (Sup. Ct. 1925),
aff'd without opinion, 216 App. Div. 832, 215 N. Y. Supp. 875 (1st Dep't, 1926).
6. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 92 (1879).
1270 [Vol. 44
NOTES
letter7 are subjects of property rights even at common law. Federal copyright lazss
further protect these.8 Also, the patent laws protect ideas which are expressed in
tangible mechanical devices. Advertising schemes or plans for making money in
business express ideas in a less concrete form than patentable mechanical devices, yet
embody more than abstract ideas. Nevertheless, the courts have generally been un-
willing to protect such schemes. Thus it has universally been held that the voluntary
disclosure of such a scheme ends all legal rights in it.0 A scheme for selling life-
insurance in a new way, which the originator revealed to the prospective purcha.er
while attempting to sell it, lost thereby its status as property, and everyone became
privileged to use it.10 Yet the disclosure of such schemes may be protected by con-
tract. For example, the originator of a scheme for combining the lead interests of the
country could enter into an enforcible contract of sale by contracting to furnish in-
formation of value before divulging to the purchaser the exact nature of the scheme.2
Such a contract may arise from the prospective purchaser's express promise to pay
for the scheme if it proves of value, or it may be implied from a course of dealing or
from an invitation to the offeror to submit his proposed scheme.'- Of course, in
order to come within the terms of such a contract, the scheme must be of value to
the buyer. Yet even when the scheme is protected by contract, the courts, imprezzed
with the practical difficulties of the problem, restrict recovery. Thus it has been said
that the scheme must be original, either embodying a novel idea or applying a com-
mon idea to a new situation.13 Contracts will not be enforced which have as subject
matter a business scheme of common knowledge, even though the scheme is of value
to the purchaser.14 Moreover, courts will take judicial notice of the common nature
of a scheme in order to sustain a demurrer to the complaint.u
7. The author of any letter has the exclusive privilege of publication or non-publication
of the ideas contained therein in their particular verbal expression. Folsom v. Mar-h, 9 Fed.
Cas. No. 4901, p. 346 (C. C. D. Mass. 1841); Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N. E. I0
(1912).
8. See Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U. S. 182, 188 (1909). Even new,-
paper advertisements are now good subjects of copyright. Ansebl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical
Co., 61 F. (2d) 131 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932).
9. Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 43 F. (2d) 685 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) (method of financing
installment buying of automobiles); Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F. (2d) 345
(C. C. A. 8th, 1934) (scheme of inserting an extra spring leaf to eliminate chaszsis ag);
Burnell v. Chown, 69 Fed. 993 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1895) (plan of gathering and cla_-ifying
business men's credit ratings); Haskins v. Ryan, 75 N. 3. Eq. 330, 78 AfU. 566 (193)
(scheme for combining lead interests of country); see Stein v. Morris, 120 Va. 39D, 394,
91 S. E. 177, 179 (1917) (Morris Plan banking).
10. Bristol v. Equitable Life, 132 N. Y. 264, 30 N. E. 505 (1892).
11. Haslins v. Ryan, 75 N. J. Eq. 330, 78 At. 566 (1903).
12. Burwell v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co., 31 Ohio App. 22, 164 N. E. 434 (1928); s~e
Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 43 F. (2d) 6S5, 687 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
13. In Masline v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Rr. Co., 95 Conn. 702, 112
Ati. 639 (1921), a plan of selling unused space to advertisers was held not to be information
of value, as contracted for, since the plan neither embodied an original idea nor applied a
common idea in a new way.
14. Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 201 App. Div. 794, 195 N. Y. Supp. 574 (2d Dcp't, 1922),
aff'd without opinion, 235 N. Y. 609, 139 N. E. 754 (1923) (raising prices to increase profits);
Burwell v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co., 31 Ohio App. 22, 164 N. E. 434 (1928) (drilling wells
to get water).
15. Masline v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Rr. Co., 95 Conn. 702, 112 At.
639 (1921).
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The holding in the principal case, that a business scheme continues to be property
even after it has been voluntarily disclosed in an offer of sale,10 eliminates the usual
requirement in such cases that the disclosure, in order to be protected by the courts,
must be made under such circumstances as would raise an express or implied contract
on the part of the defendant to pay for the idea if he uses it. In departing from the
usual rule in such cases, in an attempt to protect originators of intangible business
schemes, the instant case may be removing safeguards necessary to the protection of
business institutions against spurious charges of plagiarism. For, because of the in-
tangible nature of business schemes and the consequent difficulty of obtaining conclu-
sive evidence concerning them, it might often be impossible for a defendant to satisfy
a judge or jury that, where a certain course of action, which it had taken, followed
substantially along the lines suggested by the plaintiff's scheme, it had not adopted this
scheme, but had independently arrived at the same result. Consequently, there is a
substantial risk of being forced to pay for a scheme even though it has not been used.
If the existence of a contract protecting disclosure is held to be necessary to a recov-
ery for the use of business schemes, business institutions will not be required to
assume the hazards of a suit on alleged plagiarism unless they have voluntarily
agreed to deal with the offeror and thus assume any incidental risk of litigation.
Under the instant decision, however, business institutions are subjected to these risks
although they have not requested the offeror to deal with them, or even though they
have expressly refused to deal with him. In view of these considerations, the holding
in the principal case seems an unnecessary and unwise extension of the doctrine ap-
plicable in such cases.
LIABILITY OF MINOR CHILDREN TO ASSESSMENT ON INHERITED BANK STOCK
It has frequently been held that minor children who are holders of bank stock are
not liable under the provisions of the National Banking Act' and similar state enact-
ments2 directed toward protecting bank depositors by rendering bank stockholders
liable in the event of bank insolvency to the extent of the shares held. Since this
liability has often been held to arise "ex contractu, ' ' 4 some courts have held that a
minor may disaffirm the contract 5 and that he will be presumed to have done so as of
the time the bank became insolvent. 6 While the tendency of the federal courts has
been to consider the liability to bank stock assessment as imposed by statute rather
than assumed by contract, 7 nevertheless, by holding the assent of the stockholder
essential to the assumption of the obligation and holding minors incapable of such
16. Contra: Bristol v. Equitable Life, 132 N. Y. 264, 30 N. E. 506 (1892).
1. 38 STAT. 273 (1913), 12 U. S. C. A. § 64 (1926) provided that the stockholders of
national banks shall be individually responsible for the debts of the bank, each to the
amount of the par value of his stock in addition to the original investment.
2. See e.g. N. Y. Banking Laws (1914) § 120; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1926) § 8686.
3. See Thomas v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 2 Fed. Supp, 654, 655 (W. D. Pa., 1933);
Pate v. Bank of Newton, 116 Miss. 666, 683, 77 So. 601, 603 (1918).
4. Duncan v. Freeman, 152 Ga. 332, 110 S. E. 5 (1921); Fischer v. Chisholm, 159 S. C.
395, 157 S. E. 139 (1931); 2 MicEaE BANKs AND BAN=G (1931) c. 5, § 28; 6 Thoaurso ,
CoapoRAjrons (3d ed. 1927) § 4800.
5. Early v. Richardson, 280 U. S. 496 (1930); Aldrich v. Bingham, 131 Fed. 363 (W. D.
N. Y. 1904) ; Mellott v. Love, 152 Miss. 860, 119 So. 913 (1929).
6. Early v. Richardson, 280 U. S. 496 (1930).
7. McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154 (1905); Christopher v. Norvell, 201 U. S. 216
(1906).
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assent, the same result is reached as under the contractual theory.8 Desirous, how-
ever, of aiding in the collection of the levy on all stock of an insolvent bank, the
courts have held that where the stock has been transferred directly to or purcbased in
the name of minors, the transferor of the stock should be assessable.0  Moreover,
although a minor may not be held personally liable for the double assessment, Section 66
of the National Banking Act' 0 has been so interpreted as to make the estates of
minors" or other incompetents'2 in the hands of guardians or trustees liable to assess-
ment under that act just as the minors or incompetents would be personally liable if
competent to hold the stock and act in their own names. Thus a second means is
offered of assuring recovery on bank stock of minor children and other incompetents.
In a recent case, the problem of application of these rulings is forcibly presented.
A testator left twenty shares of national bank stock which was distributed four
shares to each of his adult children and four shares collectively to his minor grand-
children. After the death of the testator and several years after the estate had been
fully distributed and the executor discharged, the bank became insolvent and the
receiver assessed each of the legatees of the stock for the par value of his shares.
Upon the refusal of the guardian of the children to pay, suit was brought to recover
against her as guardian representing the children, or, in the alternative, by means
of a judgment against her as administratrix of the testator's estate,' 3 to reach that
estate as transferor of the stock to the minor children. The Supreme Court of
South Carolina refused to hold the children liable and also rejected the alternative
theory of relief on the ground that the testator's estate could not be subjected to a
claim which arose after the estate had been closed.14 The United States Supreme
Court, however, reversed, and while disregarding the possibility of assessing the
estate of the children under the National Banking Act, held the decedent's estate
liable as transferor to the minors, judgment to be enforced against the proceeds
of the estate in the hands of the adult legatees and the guardian of the minor grand-
children,. 5
In holding that the mere fact that the testator's estate had been dosed and the
8. Foster v. Chase, 75 Fed. 797 (C. C. D. Vt. 1896).
9. Early v. Richardson, 280 U. S. 496 (1930); Foster v. Chase, 75 Fed. 797 (C. C. D.
Vt. 1896); Aldrich v. Bingham, 131 Fed. 363 (W. D. N. Y. 1904); Cobb v. Bank of Mar-
tin, 46 Ga. App. 10, 166 S.E. 424 (1932).
10. 13 STAT. 118 (1864), 12 U. S. C. A. § 66 (1926). The "and competent to act and
hold the stock in his own name" clause has been interpreted with reference to minors as in
effect meaning "as if he were competent to hold and assume all the obligations of the
stock." MtcNair v. Darragh, 31 F. (2d) 906 (C. C. A. Sth, 1929).
11. McNair v. Darragh, 31 F. (2d) 9D6 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); Clark v. Ogilvie, 111
Ky. 181, 63 S. W. 429 (1901); cf. Heiden v. Cremin, 66 F. (2d) 943 (C. C. A. Sth, 1933)
(indirectly states that the estate is liable while holding the trustee free from liability).
Cf. Mansur v. Pratt, 101 Mass. 60 (1869), where a like result was reached in the ca
of stock of a manufacturing corporation under a statute similar to Section 66 of the N-a-
tional Banking Act. The two cases cited by the South Carolina court in the principal casc
as directly contra to this principle are not in point because they deal with state banhs
not affected by the provisions of the National Bankng Act.
12. Thomas v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 2 Fed. Supp. 654 (W. D. Pa. 1933).
13. She had been appointed administratrLx de bonis non solely for the purpose of the
suit.
14. Seabury v. Green, 173 S. C. 235, 175 S. E. 639 (1934).
15. Seabury v. Green, 294 U. S. 165 (1935). The Supreme Court considered the d
tribution statutes of South Carolina as not extinguishing the estate completely as did the
Utah statute in Forrest v. Jack, 294 U. S. 158 (1935).
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executor discharged before the levy of the stock assessment did not prevent the
estate from being held liable, the decision of the United States Supreme Court fol-
lows the general rule.16 For state statutes limiting the period for the presentment
of claims against the decedents' estates have been uniformly held no bar to recov-
ery,' 7 the theory in some cases being that the bank stock liabilities are contingent
claims which need not be filed' s and, in others, that the statutes were meant to
apply only to claims representing obligations due from the deceased during his life-
time.' 9
But the result of holding the decedent's estate liable as transferor would seem to
be a pro rata assessment of all the legatees, adults as well as minors, to meet the
judgment. This seems inequitable since the four adult children have presumably
already paid full assessments on the stock allotted to them, and thus suffer in dis-
proportionate measure if compelled to contribute pro rata with the minors for the
liability on the stock held by the latter. No valid basis appears for so discriminating
between those who have shared in a decedent's estate, for if the bank's insolvency
had occurred before the distribution of the estate, the minor's portion would have
been reduced equally with that of each of the adult legatees. Furthermore, it is
anomalous to state that children should have the privilege of receiving all the bene-
fits of such stock, and yet have their estates free from its potential burdens, There-
fore, under the circumstances of the case at hand, it would seem that a more equita-
ble result would be reached by allowing recovery from the estate of the children
in the hands of their guardian, a result apparently authorized under Section 66 of
the National Banking Act.20 If, nevertheless, the courts wish to protect such part
of minors' estates as may be derived from sources other than the decedent's estate
from being absorbed in satisfaction of bank stock liability, or fear that the children's
estate will not suffice to meet the full assessment on the stock held, in cases like
the one under consideration, a fairly equitable result might be reached by permitting
recovery from the minor children to' the extent of their share of the proceeds of the
decedent's estate before a pro rata collection for any balance remaining could be
taken from the other legatees. Thus, in the ordinary case, the injustice of a double
burden on the adult legatees would be wholly or partially avoided.
16. Luce v. Thompson, 36 F. (2d) 183 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); Davis v. Vansands, 45
Conn. 600 (1878); Dent v. Matteson, 70 Minn. 519, 73 N. W. 416 (1897), aff'd 176 U. S.
521 (1899). Cf. Forrest v. Jack, 294 U. S. 158 (1935) (interpreting statute of Utah as
declaring that distribution does not merely close an estate but completely extinguishes It
so as to bar completely any claim not included in the order of payment).
17. Zimmerman v. Carpenter, 84 Fed. 747 (C. C. S. D. 1898); Rankin v. City of Big
Rapids, 133 Fed. 670 (C. C. A. 6th, 1904); Mortimer v. Potter, 213 Ill. 178, 72 N. E. 817
(1904); Wickham v. Hull, 102 Iowa 469, 71 N. W. 352 (1897); Baird v. McMillan, 53
N. D. 257, 205 N. W. 682 (1925); Tierney v. Shakespeare, 34 N. M. 501, 284 Pac. 1019
(1930).
18. Rankin v. City of Big Rapids, 133 Fed. 670 (C. C. A. 6th, 1904); Rankin v. Herod,
140 Fed. 661 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1905); Davis v. Weed, 44 Conn. 569 (1877). Cf. reason-
ing in Baird v. McMillan, 53 N. D. 257, 205 N. W. 682 (1925).
19. Tierney v. Shakespeare, 34 N. M. 501, 284 Pac. 1019 (1930); Hirning v. Kurle,
54 S. D. 334, 223 N. W. 212 (1929).
20. Supra note 11. This interpretation of Sec. 66 is possibly open to question but Is
more in line with the federal theory of a statutory obligation.
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